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Abstract
Only small margins prevented the gas-blow out at one of Statoil's platforms, Snorre A, to
develop into a major accident in 2004. The underlying reasons of the accident showed
extensive improvement areas, including Statoil's management system.
The purpose is to find out whether the current management system at Statoil is sufficient to
prevent potential major accidents from happening at the Snorre A platform again. As a
guidance, four questions have been deduced. These include if Statoil has managed to comply
with the requirements imposed by the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway after the accident,
which changes have been made in Statoil's management system since 2004. Further, to what
extent learning from the Snorre A accident has led to changes in the management system, and
if the current management system ensures safety.
In the search of answering the research question, existing theories have served as a tool to get
deeper insight into management systems, potential major accidents, learning and subsequent
change.
Further, the case study of the Snorre A accident was carried out by interviews. The results
were further analyzed, and discussed with secondary sources. The findings shows that Statoil
has corrected all the variances found by the PSA. The accident led to many infirmities being
detected, and Statoil has employed many resources to improve its management system since
2004. This also include a higher focus on safety and compliance. However, it is found that
Statoil lack the ability of sharing knowledge and experience throughout the company, and
therefore important qualities of developing a robust organization.
The conclusion suggests that even though Snorre A has become one of the better installations
after the accident, and Statoil's management system has improved, any accident can challenge
that in the future. Therefore, it becomes difficult to say if the current management system can
prevent potential major accidents from happening.
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1 Introduction
This chapter presents the master's thesis background, purpose, research question, limitations
and structure. The background describes some of the challenges facing the Norwegian
petroleum industry, especially relating to potential major accidents. Further, the purpose of
the study is presented, with point of departure in the Snorre A blow out in 2004. This potential
major accident is discussed in relation to Statoil's management system. What becomes
interesting in this matter is to find out whether the current management system at Statoil is
sufficient to prevent potential major accidents from happening at the Snorre A platform.
Further, limitations of the study and the structure will be presented.
1.1 Background
In the late 1960s, petroleum was found on the Norwegian continental shelf. Since then, the oil
and gas activity has altered. Opened areas have become more mature, producing fields are
aging, and exploration activity have shown a definite increase. The cost level is substantially
higher, and technological developments have improved. Considerably more upstream
companies are involved in the activities, and the player scenario has widened (GOV, 2013). In
addition, the high speed of globalization lead to companies facing a new era of competition
(Davis, 2006).
The petroleum industry is currently characterized by challenging circumstances, and a high
degree of complexity. This is seen through the many potential major accidents happening,
both intemationally, and in Norway each year. The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway
(PSA) states that the important major accident indicator is currently moving in the wrong
direction. There were no major accidents in Norwegian petroleum-business in 2012, however
there were many serious incidents, where many of them had evident potential (PSA, 2013d).
According to the PSA (20130 a major accident will, in addition to the human aspects, also
have substantial consequences for society at large. The reduction of major accident risk is
therefore a crucial reason for the formulation of existing health, safety and environment
(HSE) regulations. Management has overall responsibility for managing major accident risk,
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through initiatives and decisions. Hence, it becomes important for the petroleum companies to
find ways to prevent these incidents from happening.
1.2 Purpose of the Study
November 28, 2004, a gas blow-out from well P-31A occurred at Statoil's Snorre A platform
in the Tampen area. The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway characterized this incident as
one of the most serious accidents to occur on the Norwegian shelf (Brattbakk et. al., 2005).
According to findings in the International Research Institute of Stavanger's (2011) report,
there were small margins that prevented the incident to develop to a major accident, with loss
of lives, and environmental destructions. Serious failures and deficiencies were uncovered in
all phases of Statoil's planning and implernentation of operations at Snorre A. The PSA
appointed an investigation group, which identified non-conformities and improvement areas.
These were categorized in four areas;
Lack of compliance with governing documents
Inadequate understanding and implementation of risk assessments
Inadequate management involvement
Violation of well barrier requirements
The non-conformities occurred at several levels in the organization, both off- and onshore.
The investigation showed that the number of non-conformities and improvement areas were
extensive, and could all been intercepted, and corrected if the barriers had functioned. It is
common that individual barriers fail from time to time, but an incident where so many barriers
in different phases of an operation fail, is extremely rare. The PSA has questioned why these
failures were not discovered, and corrected at an earlier point in time.
Both the PSA and Statoil are of the opinion that a good management system is crucial to
perform sufficient operator responsibility. The management system must contribute to secure
compliance with health, safety, and environmental requirements, which will minimize the
numbers of accidents and unwanted incidents (IRIS, 2011).
The purpose of the study is to analyze and discuss if the current management system at Statoil
is sufficient to prevent an accident from happening at Snorre A again. Therefore, it becomes
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important to find out whether the organization have implemented the requirements from the
PSA thoroughly in the management system, and provided sufficient changes to secure safety
in all operations. Learning from the Snorre A accident becomes vital in transferring of
knowledge and experience. An assumption is made that knowledge and experience can be
used as a tool when changing the management system.
1.3 Research Problem
The research problem in this Master's Thesis is;
"Is the current management system at Statoil sufficient to prevent potential major accidents
from happening at the Snorre A platform?"
To provide guidance in the search for a solution to the research problem, these questions
provide the foundation of this Master's Thesis:
Has Statoil managed to comply with the requirements imposed by the Petroleum
Safety Authority Norway after the Snorre A accident?
What changes have been made in Statoil's management system since 2004?
To what extent has learning from the Snorre A accident led to changes in the
management system?
Does the current management system ensure safety?
1.4 Limitations
This research question "Is the current management system at Statoil sufficient to prevent
potential major accidents from happening at the Snorre A platform?" is an open ended
question, therefore only intended to contribute to an increased understanding of the subject, as
well as a supplement to further research. In this matter, it is important to recognize that other
aspects than just the management system can prevent potential major accidents from
happening. In addition, because of the complexity in this industry, it is difficult to say that the
management system alone being either the contributor of accidents happening, or the reason
for accidents not happening. This implies that other factors than those mentioned can prevent
potential major accidents from happening.
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The focus in this thesis will be on prevention of potential major accidents in Statoil's
organization. Statoil is the actor, hence by developing the management system, and thereby
influencing the safety level both in the system as well as at the Snorre A platform.
The case is about how Statoil has learned from public reactions, as well as own experiences
from the Snorre A accident. The thesis is therefore limited by focusing on learning through
experience. There can of course be other aspects influencing learning in an organization,
which can be an interesting aspect to consider in further research.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
This master's thesis is divided in eight chapters, including references. In the first chapter, the
background, purpose of the study, research question and limitations are introduced. The
second chapter will present theories relevant to solve the master's thesis research question.
The theories are used as a foundation for the research methodology, the results and the
discussion chapters. In chapter three, the research methodology is described in terms of
research process, data collection methods and analysis. Reliability and validity will also be
evaluated, in addition to limitations. The fourth chapter presents the empiric background in
this thesis. This includes an introduction of Statoil, the Snorre A organization, and the
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway. Also, Statoil's management system, and the underlying
causes of the Snorre A accident will be described. The fifth chapter presents the results found
through collection of primary data. These results will be further discussed with secondary
sources in chapter six. This discussion makes the foundation for the conclusion drawn in
chapter seven. Chapter eight presents the sources used in this master's thesis.
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2 Theoretical Framework
This chapter presents theories that are relevant to solve the master's thesis research question.
The theories are used as a foundation for the research methodology, the results and the
discussion chapters. The main sections of the theoretical framework have its point of
departure in the management system, potential major accidents, learning and change. These
theories will help get a better understanding of the various aspects that need to be considered
when answering the research question. The management system is an important tool for the
organization to implement safe operations. When a potential major accident happen, it will be
important to learn from experience, and to change the management system accordingly. The
chapter ends with a theoretical summary, including a delimitation of the most important
features of theory further used in this thesis.
2.1 The Management System
According to Horngren, et al. (2009) a management system is a means of gathering, and using
information to aid and coordinate planning and control decisions throughout an organization.
The management system becomes vital to guide the behavior in the organization and should
be closely aligned with the company's strategies and goals. This is of particular importance in
the petroleum industry, where daily high-risk operations are executed. The management
system functions as a framework for safe operations by providing principles and control
mechanisms.
2.1.1 The Development of the Management System
Schiefloe and Vikland (2007) argue of a clear development of the management system from a
technical age, through the age of human factors, and now the age of management and culture.
"The technical age" focused on the technical standard of machines and infrastructure, where
safety was considered primarily as a technical challenge. "The age of human factors" have an
understanding of technical solutions alone, cannot guarantee sufficient safety, since human
behavior and action influence operations. With this basis, the human-machine issues are put to
the agenda. Organization of work premises, ergonomics, perception and other factors become
central conditions. "The age of management and culture" asserts that management systems,
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and organizing are important elements for achieving safety. Some writers emphasize the
formal aspects of the organization as structures and regulations, whereas others draw in
informal aspects and safety-culture as central variables of explanation.
The age of management and culture is seen as important to many researchers. According to
Simons (1995), the management system should be built upon formal and information-based
routines and procedures that management use to maintain, or change the direction of the
activities in the organization's activities. Merchant and Van der Stede (2007) argue that
certain compositions of principles, and other underlying factors such as culture and values,
can affect how these function in the organization. The increasing knowledge of the interplay
between various elements in the management system is also important to understand the
underlying causes of accidents (PSA, 2013a).
Accordingly, it becomes important to understand how the management system is cormected,
and how the management principles affect each other (Ribe, 2009). A framework much used
in the petroleum industry is to build the management system around Man, Technology, and
Organization (MTO) (PSA, 2004). This perspective underline that human behavior are
connected with, or influenced by, technological and organizational aspects. All these factors
need therefore consideration when preparing the management system, and hence improving
safety in operations (Schiefloe and Vikland, 2007).
2.1.2 The Pentagon Model as a Framework for the Management System
The operations carried out on platforms are good examples of a field that impose great
challenges in the interplay between human, technology, and organization. The driller must
have control over the well, lead the work on deck —in addition to use technical advanced, and
monitor-based solutions in the drilling department. Because of this, it can be challenging to
understand, operate, and keep an overview over all information, in addition to having physical
control of what is happening on deck (PSA, 2013a).
The MTO perspective frames the central safety-elements on a higher level. However, it does
not say anything about the connections or interface between the elements, and does not give
further directions regarding what specific characteristics about man, tecimology, or the
organization to be considered.
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Sincethemanagementsystemcomposemanyprinciples,andevenmoreunderlyingfactors,it
is importanto geta goodoverviewoverthevariousconnectionsin additionto knowingwhat
the outcomewillbe if thereareanychangesimplementedin thesystem(MerchandandVan
derStede,2007).In thisway,MTOneedsto be furtheramplifiedwhenusedinpractice.This
appliesespeciallyfor thefactorsManandOrganization(SchiefloeandVikland,2007).
SchiefloeandVikland(2006)talkabouta fivedimensionalmodel,thePentagonModel,
whichisbasedonan earliermodelby Schiefloe.Thefivedifferentdimensionsareformal
structure,culture,interactionandworkpractices,thestateof theinformalrelationsand
networks,andtechnology.Thisis displayedinFigure1.
Forma Structure Technology
Safety
Critical
Cu,ture Re;at:ons Network
Behavior
Interaction
Figure 1: The Pentagon Model
(Schiefloe and Vikland, 2006)
SafetyCriticalBehaviorcanbe definedasthoseelementsin a workprocessthatdirectlyor
indirectlyhaveconsequencesforwhetheraccidentsorunwantedincidentshappen,andis
understoodasbeinginfluencedbytheorganizationalattributesin thefivedimensionalmodel.
Figure1illustrateshowsafety-criticalbehaviorcanbe analyzedfroma constructivist
perspective.Peopleareengagedin differentactivities,interpretsituationsandtasksthey
perform,andchoosetheiractionsbasedontheirunderstandingandevaluationof a set of
internalandexternalfactors(SchiefloeandVikland,2006).Thesafetylevelin complexand
tightly-coupledorganizationsarea functionof aninteractionbetweenhuman,technological
andorganizationalfactors,wheretheabsolutesafetylevelis decidedbytheweakestlinkin
the chain,andby thebarriersof technologicalororganizationalcharacterthatcancompensate
if a linkin thechainfails(SchiefloeandVikland,2007).
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2.1.2.1 Formal Structure
The formal structure is of high relevance at an oil installation. The formal structure creates a
framework for the employee's behavior, and thereby safety critical behavior. This is done
through governing documentation, sharing of knowledge through different systems, work
instructions, and field of responsibility (Schiefloe and Vikland, 2007).
2.1.2.2 Culture
Cultural conditions, such as values, attitudes, working habits, and manners are important
explanatory factors when understanding what is happening in an organization. The same
applies for histories wandering in the community, and experiences generated by the
individual. If stories are told from co-workers about negative reactions from management
when raising objectives or critical questions, it can lead to the environment being imprinted
with a general restraint with these annotations. Other central topics are what understanding
prevails regarding taking chances, and how difficult trade-offs and priorities are handled.
Competence is also important, not just on individual level, but on group and system level
(Schiefloe and Vikland, 2007).
2.1.2.3 Interaction
Qualities about the interaction is of high significance. Key words are management,
communication, teamwork, and work processes. These are important factors in an
organization to generate safety critical behavior.
2.1.2.4 Relations Network
In a work situation, the informal aspects of an organization also play an important part. This
implies for example the relations existing in the organization between colleagues, leaders, and
subordinates affected by friendship, trust or distrust. Informal networks can for example
function as a source of information, and exchange of experience. A key concept in this
connection is social capital, a collective term for resources that is available, or builds upon
informal relations (Bø and Schiefloe, 2007). In accordance with safety, one can also find
examples of what is called negative social capital, for example conflicts or mistrust (Schiefloe
and Vikland, 2007)
2.1.2.5 Technology
The management system must ensure that technological conditions are under control. On an
oil-installation, this is tied to the standard of the equipment, maintenance, routines of working
and coordination of operations. The system must ensure that routines are done properly, and
that equipment is in perfect condition (Schiefloe and Vikland, 2007).
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2.2 Potential Major Accidents and the Management System
Potential major accidents have become a great focus to companies operating in the petroleum
industry. This is due to the severe consequences these accidents have both on the
environment, on the company, and safety of the people employed. A management system can
create a framework for safe operations; however, the question is whether it can prevent
potential major accidents from happening.
2.2.1 Potential Major Accidents
In recent years, there have been many potential major accidents in the petroleum industry. A
major accident is defined by the PSA (2013f) as an acute incident which immediately, or
subsequently, causes several serious injuries and/or loss of human life, serious harm to the
environment and/or loss of substantial material assets. By potential means that the incident
concerned, under slightly different circumstances, could have developed into a major accident
(PSA, 2013e).
Turner (1978), Wachira (1996), Jervis (1997), and Rochlin (1999) (cited in Boin, 2008) claim
that we can expect more accidents in the modern environment. These accidents are often
transboundary, which appears when the functioning of multiple systems are threatened,
characterized by the potential of crossing geographic and functional boundaries. They are
affected by the operations and systems in the organization. If the organization are dealing with
complex interactions, and hold tightly coupled systems, as in the petroleum industry,
unanticipated failures will occur. Tightly coupled systems are characterized by having more
time-dependent processes, coordinated sequences, little slack, and hold safety devices which
are limited to those that have been planned and designed into the system (Perrow, 1984).
Complexity and tight coupling can amplify these chain reactions and lead to increased risk
(IRIS, 2011). This means that the operations must be done right the first time, since there is
little opportunity to improvise if something goes wrong (Rijpma, 1997).
2.2.2 Major Accidents and Management of Barriers
The PSA have in recent years seen an increasing degree of interaction, and coupling between
safety and management systems. There are regulations of sufficient independence between
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safety barriers, including requirements of the safety systems being able to carry out intended
functions independent of other systems. As a consequence of the technological development,
there is an increasing use of integrated systems, including management- and safety systems
often delivered by the same producer. Hence, using jointly software- and user interface in
different systems, performing integrated operations, having jointly hardware, as well as
having an increased signal transmission between systems (PSA, 2010b).
Reason (1997) argues that major accidents normally appear in a combination of active errors
of action and latent organizational conditions, which appear in form of weaknesses in the hard
and soft safety barriers between the action and the accident. The individual barrier can have
many weaknesses or holes. At the best, other barriers will intercept the first barrier's
weakness and thereby prevent accidents from happening. This is often mentioned as the Swiss
Cheese Model. When all barriers and defense mechanisms fail, the simple incident will
transmit in the system and the accident will become a fact (IRIS, 2011).
Questions as to whether it is possible to prevent these accidents, or if they are inevitable are
discussed by various theorists. In this matter, this thesis will investigate if a management
system can contribute to safe operations, and to prevent potential major accidents from
happening.
2.2.3 Organizational Accident Theory
The management system has gotten a completely different focus than earlier, incorporating
various aspects of the organization. In this matter, safety is an important keyword, which is a
strict focus in offshore activities. Why then are still many potential major accidents happening
in the petroleum industry?
There are several viewpoints of whether organizations are able to prevent accidents from
happening, or if they are inevitable. A crucial understanding agreed upon is that it takes "just
the right combination of circumstances to produce a catastrophe" (Perrow, 1994; Reason,
1990, in Boin 2008). This is a combination of unruly technology and organizational
vulnerability (Boin, 2008). Rosness, et al. (2010, cited in Tinmannsvik, et al., 2011) comprise
six different perspectives; Normal accident theory, high reliability theory, energy-barrier
perspective, information-flow perspective, the goal-conflict perspective, and resilience
engineering perspective. Three of these theories will be discussed in this thesis:
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2.2.3.1 Normal Accident Theory
Normal accident theory seeks to explain how dangerous technologies can escalate out of
control. Theorists supporting this view say that organizations must use structures and process
to harness the dangerous potential of powerful technologies. However, the more complex
technology and interactions in an organization, the harder it will be for the operators to
understand the system. Therefore, organizations will be expected to suffer more breakdowns
as society becomes more complex and tightly coupled (Perrow, 1999 cited in Boin, 2008).
Even though accidents might be rare, they become a normal result of integral characteristics
of the system, and hence inevitable over time (Rijpma, 1997). A management system is
therefore needed, but not sufficient to prevent accidents from happening since they are
inevitable.
2.2.3.2 High Reliability Theory
This perspective tries to explain how organizations operating high-risk systems avoid
accidents from happening. This theory is based on thorough studies of organizations
demonstrating a surprising capacity, and ability to handle complex technologies without
major accidents happening (LaPorte and Consolini, 1991). Central elements in this
perspective are organizational redundancy and the ability of changing operational mode in
line with changing demands of capacity (Tinmannsvik, et al., 2011).
High reliability theory assesses that with use of intelligent organizational design and a good
management, serious accidents with hazardous technologies can be prevented. The common
assumption is not that human beings have the ability of behaving rational, but that a properly
designed, and well-managed organization can compensate for human frailties. These
organizations hold highly formalized structures, focusing on achieving clear and constant
goals (Scott, 1967 cited in Rijpma, 1997).
Within high reliability organization theory, defense mechanisms are divided in two categories,
hard and soft (Reason, 1997). Hard defense mechanisms are related to all types of technical
arrangements that are supposed to prevent operations from going wrong, and to warn humans
about this. Examples are, among other factors, automatic safety systems, warnings, and access
codes. Soft defense mechanisms are every organizational initiative, which is meant to reduce
risk of unwanted incidents, as regulations, surveillance, routines, procedures and training
(IRIS, 2011). The interplay between hard and soft defense mechanisms constitutes the total
robustness of the organization, or the teclmological system. In accordance with the theory,
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human action is the main reason why accidents happen, since human beings continuously
make risky actions and active mistakes.
2.2.3.3 Resilience Engineering Perspective
The Resilience Engineering perspective is partially made from combining parts of several
perspectives, however, is further extended. The traditional approach of safety has clear
limitations, since complex organizations are under continuous change. The resilience
engineering perspective focuses on organizations being robust. The idea behind the theory is
to have the ability to detect and adapt to various situations in the system and the environment
without persistent interruptions (Hollnagel, Woods, and Leveson, 2006). Hollnagel (2011)
operates with four characteristics to create a robust organization:
The ability to react to assumed and unforeseen errors and disturbances
The ability to monitor what is going on
The ability of foresee possible prospective threats and opportunities,
The ability to learn from mistakes and success.
Important fundamental premises for a resilient organization are knowledge, competence,
resources, and time (Hollnagel, Woods and Leveson, 2006).
2.2.2.4 Discussion of the Differing Theories
The normal accidents theorists emphasize structural factors of interactive complexity and tight
coupling as increasing the probability of accidents, regardless of the intent of management
and the management system. In addition, even if there are increased priorities of safety goals,
they may be inconsistent and conflicting, which again increase the risk of accidents (Rijpma,
1997).
Because of complex technological systems at platforms, high reliability theorists place great
emphasis on the need for redundancy. This involves duplication, and overlap of critical
components and personnel to improve safety. Still, normal accidents theorists assert that
accidents are inevitable, since more than one component can fail independently at the same
time. The Bhopal plant chemical disaster is an example of this; deadly gasses escaped because
three separate safety devices all failed simultaneously. Negative consequences of redundancy
may be that redundant systems are often less independent than their designers believe, and
that redundant backups increase the interactive complexity (Rijpma, 1997).
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Today, organizations deal with unexpected dangers in a very rapid fashion. The normal
accidents theorists question how a management system will ensure that lower-level personnel
will identify situations properly and take appropriate actions in crises. To overcome this
problem, high reliability theorists claim that the organizations must recruit, socialize, and train
personnel to maintain a strong organizational culture with emphasis on safety and reliability.
This constant process is believed to contribute to reduced error rates. According to Roberts,
Rousseau and La Porte (cited in Rijpma, 1997) these factors will produce a self-regulating
work unit where operators directly address risk, and uncertainties.
The high reliability theorists put faith in organizations dealing with dangerous technology for
decades without any major accidents, which is reflected in the safety culture incorporated in
the organizations' management system (Boin, 2008). The normal accidents theorists on the
other hand, are of the opinion that it will be impossible to make organizations more reliable
by importing elements of a safety culture (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2002 cited in Boin, 2008).
The increasing presence of technology in modern society harvests the potential for great
inadvertent destruction. Therefore, by relying on a safety culture, there will be a concern of
leaders becoming listless because of robust design, skilled operators and luck. It might lead to
a false optimism, and perhaps complacency about the probability of a catastrophic failure
(LaP orte, 1994).
Even though normal accident- and high reliability theory try to explain the underlying factors
of an accident, a firmly tested theory does not exist. However, the development of safety
critical behavior can be seen as a consequence of increased understanding of the safety-
challenges, in addition to an understanding of MTO factors being important. The resilient
engineering perspective, which describe that organizations must focus on being robust, is an
extended perspective built upon these theories. It is emphasized to establish fundamental
characteristics, as reacting to assumed and unforeseen events, to monitor what is going on, to
foresee prospective threats and opportunities, and to learn from mistakes and success. To
achieve this, the right competence, knowledge, resources and time must be available
(Tinmannsvik, et al., 2011). A question becomes whether it is possible to develop these
characteristics, and thereby avoid accidents from happening.
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2.2.4 Development of Robust Organizations
Hollnagel (2011) suggest that it is possible to develop a robust organization if the company
has the ability of quickly responding to unexpected, and expected situations. This is
dependent on a balanced interaction between the ability of monitoring what is currently
happening, to foresee future developments, and to learn from previous mistakes and
successes. These robust characteristics require special competence, and must be incorporated
in the management system.
However, the robust characteristics are not always easy to develop. Organizations show
evident scarcities of monitoring the current situation, to learn from the past, and at the same
time be able to foresee prospective development. Andersen and Albrechtsen (cited in
Tinmannsvik, et al., 2011) conclude with some recommendations of improving the
organizations ability of adapting to mistakes and interruptions, with a balance between
fundamental qualities for robust organizations. This includes, among other factors, to develop
the management system and strategies for safety management that ensure balance between
compliance of requirements, and the ability of adapting to changes to handle unforeseen and
foreseen situations. Further, to improve competence and working situations, and adapt these
to uncertain and dynamic outcomes in well and drilling operations. It is important to use
proactive process safety indicators to monitor relations that can be dangerous to the safety in
the nearest future, to involve all parts of the organization for better support, and improve the
systems of information sharing between distributed participants for better decision-support.
Finally, they emphasize to handle goal-conflicts between efficiency and safety, and to
improve the ability to learn from previous accidents and successes.
To avoid potential major accidents from happening, it is assumed in this thesis that the robust
characteristics must be introduced, and incorporated through the management system. This
means to include them in the formal structure, in culture, technology, interaction, and
relations network. This connection is shown in Figure 2. However, a question becomes
whether these robust characteristics are possible to develop, and thereby prevent potential
major accidents from happening. Therefore, features of all accident theories will be included
when discussing if it is possible to develop a robust organization.
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Figure 2: Resilient Organization and the Management System
2.3 Learning and Change after Acddents
When potential major accidents happen, a focus must be on change, and development of the
existing management system as a way of securing that they do not happen again.
Respectively, underlying causes must be investigated, and initiatives incorporated in the
management system. Hence, a focus on leaming from previous experience both through own
experience, and detected variances by outsiders. When changes are made, it is emphasized
that training is important to provide sufficient training to secure that the changes are complied
with, which was especially emphasized by the high reliability theorists.
2.3.1 Learning
Learning is an important factor for change and improvement of the management system when
a potential major accident has happened. Learning can help improve the management system
through the experience obtained, and sharing of knowledge. As Wildavsky (1988) said,
"Without trials there can be no new errors; but without these errors, there is also less new
learning."
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2.3.1.1 Learning through Experience
Kaufmann and Kaufmann (1996) define learning as the acquirement of knowledge and skills
that is relative permanent, and has its foundation in experience.
A cognitive theory, which is relevant for this type of learning, is developed by the American
psychologist David Kolb. In Kolb's theory the learning process is viewed as a cyclic process
as in Figure 3:
Figure 3: Learning as a Cyclic Process
(Kaufmann and Kaufmann, 1996)
The learning process starts with engaging in a definite experience, as a potential major
accident. When an accident happen in an organization, it is possible to observe the situation,
and later reflect on possible causes for this passive experience. In this matter, it is focused on
observations and experience from the employees in the organization, in addition to third
parties observing the situation. Further, it is common to start describing definite experiences
in form of abstract concepts and principles. When finding the most relevant concepts, a
generalization of the experience with other similar situations that has certain common features
is made. The findings from the analysis of the situation become subject of further testing in
other related situations. If the hypothesis holds, a better solution to handling problems is
established. This implies that transfer of experiences into learning requires the use of
experiences to enrich knowledge, in such a way that similar situations can be handled
correctly and efficient in the future. However, this does not imply a simple and direct
coupling between experience and learning. Psychological research show that learning from
experience is often very difficult, and impose many challenges to organizations. The main
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reason is because of the practical and pulsating work-life that demonstrates complex, and
ambiguous situations (Kaufmann and Kaufmann, 1996).
2.3.2 Development of Systems
To manage change after a potential major accident is not easy. Sirkin, Keenan and Jackson
(2005) say that part of the problem lies in people's interpretation of what factors influence
transformation initiatives the most. Also, the various reasons for a potential major accident
happening. Each person will look at an initiative from their viewpoint, and base the decisions
on personal experience.
Argyris and Schøn (in Kaufmann and Kaufmann, 1996) put an emphasis on making a system
suitable of correcting mistakes, and solving problems. Focus is directed towards
implementing systems and forms of practice, which make the organization a learning
organism. Organizations learn, and change on a continuous basis, due to both external and
internal sources of stimulation. Further, they claim that much of learning in organizations is
characterized as single loop leaming. This means that existing procedures, and routines are
adjusted by correcting variances and mistakes. Activities within the organization require,
however, a great deal of new problem-solving. If the participants question basic principles in
how the operations in the company are carried out, and maybe find mistakes and shortages,
the process has gone further to a double loop learning.
2.3.2.1 Development of Barriers
Management of barriers becomes important when changing the management system. This
includes processes, systems, solutions and initiatives that need to be in place to secure safety
through implementation of barriers, hence both hard and soft defense mechanisms. To secure
good handling of safety and risk, the involved personnel must have an understanding of why
barriers are established (PSA, 2013c).
Recently, investigations of serious incidents, and major accidents in safety-critical industries
have put a focus on change processes as a considerable risk-contributor (PSA, 2010a). Also,
changes in procedures often involve new elements added to already existing work-process
descriptions. This can lead to over-specification and increased complexity, and thereby
complicate compliance. The result is an increased gap between defined procedures and
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practice(IRIS,2011).Thesefactorsmustbe consideredwhenchangingpartsof the
managementsystem,sincenewsolutionscanestablishlatentweaknesses(PSA,2010a).
2.3.2.2Training
Whenchangesare required,theentireorganizationmustgothroughsufficientrainingto
ensurethatexperience,andlearningfromtheaccidentareunderstood,andsharedthroughthe
managementsystem.
A beliefthattraininginuse of themanagementsystemsis thebestwayof learningfromits
mistakes,impliesthatthereis animplicitcomprehensionofmanyof thecausesto mistakes
arestaffmembersincorrectuseof thesystems.Mistakesleadto lackof complianceof work
processesandrequirements.Alternatively,onecouldalignthesearchlightowards
simplificationandimprovementsofprocedures,or emphasizedhowrules,demandsand
proceduresinteractwithcompetence,useof estimatesandindependentevaluationability.
Thatmistakesariseis oftenexplainedbyconditionswiththeemployee,forexamplelackof
motivationor willto followdefinedprocedures.Suchanunderstandingof learningis related
to a perspectiveon safety,whichis calledBehavior-basedsafety(BBS).Thefocusin BBSis
directedtowardschangeofworkers'behaviorto preventaccidents.Theunderlyingaspectsof
thisperspectiveis to getanunderstandingof thepossibilitiesforaccidentsas a consequence
ofuncertainbehaviorfromworkers(IRIS,2011).
TheBBS-perspectiveis criticizedofunderestimatingandrelocatefocusawayfromotherand
morefundamentalfactorsthatcanbe thereasonforaccidentshappening.Evaluationsand
actionsmadeby theemployeeina concretesituation,forexamplewhethersystemsand
governingdocumentationis tobeused,is donewithinan operationalandorganizational
context.A consequenceof thisperceptionis thattheorganizationalandoperationalcontextdo
not gettheproperevaluation.Improvementworksubsequento accidentsin a perspectivelike
thiswilltherebyemphasizechangesandadaptationsof governingdocumentationandtraining
inuse of systemswithinexistingframeworks.Thework-contextwilltherebybethe same
independentof the changesbeingmade.Theapproachin thisthesisis ontheorganizational
level,andthe managementsystemthatcreatesa frameworkforemployees.Themanagement
systemmustbe preparedin sucha waythatemployeesareguidedwithsafetycriticalbehavior
throughtraining.
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2.4 Theoretical Summary
Severaltheorieshavebeendeductedin thischapter.Theaimis to geta betteroverviewover
theproblemsfacingthepetroleumindustrytoday,especiallyregardingthemanagement
system,accidents,learningandchange.Nevertheless,themostimportantfeaturesofthe
theoryusedwillbe describedin thissection.
Thecurrentviewonmanagementsystemsattachesimportanceto itsvitalfunctionto achieve
safety.Bothformalandinformalaspectsof theorganizationareemphasized,becauseof an
increasedunderstandingof interactionsbetweenthem.ThePentagonModel(Figure1)serves
as a basisforthe managementsystemin thisthesis.Thisincludesformalstructure,culture,
interaction,relationsandnetwork,andtechnology.
Regardingaccidenttheory,threedifferentorganizationalviewpointsweredescribed.These
includenormalaccidenttheory,highreliabilitytheory,andtheresilientengineering
perspective.Thisthesiswilltakethethreetheoriesintoconsiderationwhendoingresearch.
Nevertheless,themaincomprehensionis whetherit ispossibleto developsufficientrobust
characteristicsthroughthevariouspartsof thepentagonmodel,andtherebypreventpotential
majoraccidentsfromhappening.Thisis describedin figure2.
Further,learningis limitedto onlyconsideringlearningfromownexperience,as wellas
variancesdetectedby third-parties.Thiscanbe demonstratedin figure3, throughdeveloping
bettersolutionsafteran accidenthashappened.Thisnewexperienceandknowledgeis usedto
implementchangesin themanagementsystem.In thismatter,thereis an emphasisin training
of personnel,muchbecauseof theBehaviorbasedsafetyperspectiveprevailingin the
petroleumindustry.
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3 Research Methodology
In this chapter, the research approach is described in terms of the methodological process,
data collection, analysis, quality of the data, and limitations. The study is based on the
research question in chapter 1, and hence the four questions deduced to provide guidance in
this search. The methodological procedure will be presented by discussing the purpose of the
research, research approach, strategy, and the case-study method. The data collection explains
the choice of sources, and the interview process. Further, the data analyzed are presented, in
addition to reliability, validity, and the limitations of the data.
3.1 Methodological Process
The research methodology is those techniques and procedures used to collect and analyze
research data (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009).
3.1.1 The Purpose of the Study —Strategy and Design
In the research methodology, the problem to be addressed was weighed heavily when
choosing research strategy. There are two strategies which can be chosen to illustrate the
research question; a qualitative, or a quantitative approach. It is also possible to use these
approaches as complementary, meaning use of triangulation (Ringdal, 2009).
The research design is the general plan of how the research question is answered (Saunders,
Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). According to Ringdal (2009) a design is the researchers plan, or
sketch for an investigation. There are many different designs, which can be used, dependent
on the purpose of the study. Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009) divide these in an
explorative, a descriptive, or a causal research. Choice of design will be based on the study's
research question and the purpose of the study. This involves several features; what is studied,
existing theory, and to which extent the theory can be used to explain the research theme
(Hillestad, 2004).
3.1.2 Research Approach
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009) suggest that it is possible to divide between two types
of approaches when doing research. The deductive approach use existing theory, which serves
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as a foundation for empiric observations. An inductive approach starts in the opposite end by
first observing a phenomenon. Thereby, the existing empiricism is used to create insight into a
current problem. This is further solved through hypothesis or a theory.
This research has used existing theory of management systems, potential major accidents,
learning, and subsequent change. Research about the Snorre A accident were also available
regarding these aspects. Together, this have served as a foundation when carrying out the
research. The goal was not to create new theories, but to use existing theory and collected data
to create insight into a current problem. Therefore, the study has both deductive and inductive
features.
The research question creates a platform for a hypothesis testing, which will be analyzed and
discussed in this thesis; If Statoil's management system is sufficient to prevent potential major
accidents from happening at the Snorre A platform, compared to the situation in 2004. Four
questions have been deducted to provide guidance in this search. This includes if Statoil has
complied with the requirements imposed by the PSA, to what extent learning has led to
changes in the management system, what these changes have been, and if the current
management system ensures safety.
3.1.3 The Case Study Method
In this master's thesis, the case study is used as the research strategy, since the objective is to
explore, and analyze an empiric phenomenon. According to Yin (2003) a case study is an
empiric investigation of a phenomenon in its natural environment, where several data sources
are used. Robson (2002) further argues for the advantage of going in depth, and to get a
profound understanding of the problem.
The case study to be explored is the Snorre A platform, with a point of departure in the blow-
out happening in 2004. This was a peculiar case, where many factors in the management
system failed. Changes in the system have been implemented since 2004, but the question is
whether these changes are sufficient to prevent other potential major accidents from
happening. The case will be further described in chapter 4.
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As mentioned, Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009) described three different types of
studies to be used. Explorative studies are appropriate if there is no evident comprehension to
the problem, and if there is a desire to define this more precisely. A descriptive study is used
to describe the reality as detailed as possible, while a causal study is testing of hypothesis in
causal relations. A descriptive study have a relative good understanding of the problem-area,
however, there is a desire to further investigate elements that can create correlation between
variables (Johannessen, Kristoffersen and Tufte, 2011). This research will be relative
explorative, but also have considerable features of a descriptive study. The findings cannot be
generalized, however the results can be used as an interesting implication for further research.
Summarized, this thesis is an exploratory and descriptive study of whether Statoil's
management system is sufficient to prevent potential major accidents from happening at the
Snorre A platform.
3.2 Data Collection
Data collection methods can be divided into two categories; primary- and secondary data.
Primary data are sources collected by the researcher, in this case through interviews, whereas
secondary data are sources that other people have collected, which is usually used for other
purposes.
Both primary and secondary data can be divided in two categories; qualitative and
quantitative data (Ringdal, 2009). Quantitative data are based on numbers and are numerical
and standardized. Qualitative data, on the other hand, are based on sense through words,
which are non-numerical and non-standardized (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). The
emphasis in this study is on qualitative data, but quantitative data is also used through reports
and previous research. This contributes to secure validity and reliability (Yin, 2003), and is
called triangulation. This means to use multiple data sources to get a better understanding of
what is explored, with the purpose of confirming the same facts (Ringdal, 2009). The
availability of research is extensive, both regarding theory presented in chapter two, as well as
secondary sources discussed in chapter six. Secondary sources includes underlying causes of
the accidents, initiatives reports carried out by Statoil, reports on the implications for the
organization, and to which extent the organization has learned from the accident. Therefore, it
has been important to use this existing research as a foundation when carrying out this work,
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and supplement own findings through qualitative interviews.
3.2.1 Secondary Data
This research was initiated by collecting secondary data. The objective was to get deep insight
in existing theory about the several themes important for the thesis. Secondary data has been
very important when carrying out this work, much since not having direct access to Statoil's
organization, and because much research has been done in connection with the Snorre A
accident, as well as similar accidents in posterity. The availability of investigation reports,
research, and articles regarding the underlying sources of the Snorre A accident, as well as
implications for Statoil's management system after several initiatives conducted, are many.
This includes, among other things, the IRIS report, SINTEF report, and much work carried
out by Schiefloe and Vikland (2005;2006;2007).
The advantages with use of these sources, are the low degree of cost and time to collect it.
However, when using these sources, the importance of securing reliability and val idity was
considered. One of the greatest problems when using secondary data, is that the data used are
collected for other purposes. Hence, the information may not always be suitable to illuminate
the research problem. Further, a lack of knowledge of how the secondary sources have been
collected implies difficulties of knowing how representative the sources were. An evaluation
was therefore made to use multiple sources, to find proof of validity and reliability. The most
relevant appraisal criteria used in this thesis was the current interest of the problem, who has
collected the data, the motive behind the data collection, methods, sample and sample
methods, and possible sources of error.
3.2.2 Quantitative Data
Quantitative data was used through the secondary information collected. This has provided
with statistics and measures in the analysis. These have helped in the support of findings in
the result, and also to reveal disparities between primary and secondary sources.
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3.2.3 Primary Data
Primary data are sources that have been collected for the purpose for this thesis, through
interviews. Two important decisions was how many informants to use, and how to choose
these to get a best possible result. Since a qualitative method was used in collection of
primary sources, a limited number of informants was sufficient. These were chosen
strategically to get various viewpoints and insight of the research question. lnterviews were
carried out with seven informants, having various backgrounds related to the Snorre A
accident, and Statoil's management system.
The interviewed people in this master's thesis were:
Person working at the Snorre A platform when the blow-out occurred (Currently
working at another platform at Statoil)
Doctor, scholarship-holder/researcher at NTNU, which contributed with the causal
analysis after the Snorre A accident
Senior researcher with PhD in Social Anthropology at NTNU. Participated in Statoil's
internal investigation, and in an evaluation of initiatives at Statoil.
Two principal engineers working at the Well and Drilling department at the Petroleum
Safety Authority Norway
Person currently working as Leader and former Leading Advisor in a discipline
covering safety technology in Statoil, Stavanger
Comments from Land Chief at Snorre A
3.2.4 Qualitative Method
The qualitative method is based on a social constructed world through the actions of the
individual. This means that a social phenomenon is not stable, but in continuous change.
A qualitative method was used since the problem to be addressed in this thesis is complicated.
It was a search for an understanding around Statoil's management system, and its implications
for potential major accidents and safety. The theories derived are a basis for the primary and
secondary sources, and to find out whether the research problem can be supported by
evidence.
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Using a qualitative method when collecting primary data made it easier to understand, and to
get an overview of the research problem. This, because it is difficult to find all the variables
and values that can affect the problem to be addressed.
3.2.4.1 Qualitative Interviews
The objective of a qualitative research is to achieve comprehensive information from
informants about experiences, thoughts, and feelings. To achieve this it is important to
encourage the interview person to describe their situation in own terms (Lilledahl and Hegnes,
2000), which was done when carrying out interviews.
According to Lilledahl and Hegnes (2000) there are different ways of carrying out an
interview:
Unstructured interview: In an unstructured interview, there is a theme, but the
questions is adapted to the specific interview situation
Structured interview: In this interview the theme and formulation are decided upon in
advance
Semi-structured interview: The most common type of interview. This type has an
interview guide as a starting point, however the questions and themes and its sequence
can vary
This research was carried out by using both an unstructured, and a semi-structured technique.
This means that an interview-guide was used as a starting point when carrying out the
research. However, since the informants had varying backgrounds, and different connections
to Statoil, the interviews were adapted to the specific interview object. In addition, follow-up
questions, which were not decided upon in the first place, were also asked to ensure that as
much information as possible was generated.
The interview guide was designed in advance of the interviews. This included themes,
sequence, and formulation. This preparation increased the scope of the data, and made the
data collection more systematic. In addition, by doing this, potential gaps were to a greater
extent foreseen, and filled. However, each interview was adapted to informant, since they had
different positions and connections to Statoil and the Snorre A accident.
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By choosing to perform most telephone interviews, time and costs were saved for both parts.
Most of the informants were located in various parts of Norway, hence natural to carry out
interviews by telephone. Both personal- and telephone interviews were suggested to the
informants, however, most of them found a telephone interview more suitable.
3.2.4.2 Telephone Interview
The telephone interview was the most applied interview method, and therefore the primary
source of data collection. This was much due to geographical distances, and also a request
from some of the informants. This was both time- and cost saving, hence advantageous for
both parts. The telephone interview was easy to arrange, by sending out e-mail to the potential
candidates. Most of them answered quickly, and was willing to contribute to answering
questions.
Disadvantages noticed when using telephone interview were that questions must be
formulated in a certain way to avoid misinterpretation. In addition, the interviews should not
take too long time. The average time of the telephone interviews was about one hour with
each of the informants. Also, another disadvantage is the lack of visual representation and
little control of the environment of the respondent (Kunnskapssenteret, 2013c).
3.2.4.3 Personal Interview
The personal interview was also used. This was due to being geographical near to the
respondent, and also to get an in depth conversation.
Advantages noticed when using personal interviews were the flexibility, and a nearness to the
informant. It was also easier to ask questions more in depth. A personal interview also gave
the best control possibilities, since the respondent's identity could be considered
(Kunnskapssenteret, 2013a).
The disadvantages is the possibility of affecting the informant, and to construct answers by
mistake. In addition, this method is considered as more costly and demanding in resources.
This was however not the case here, other than travelling costs. The informant was near in
geographical distance, and a choice was therefore made to get a personal interview.
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3.3 Analysis of Data
When the telephone interviews were carried out, questions and answers were written down
simultaneously as they answered. This was subsequently translated into English, which
prevented the analysis from using direct quotation.
When carrying out the analysis, the data material was organized by creating different
paramount themes where this was possible. In most interviews, there were certain aspects
which was not covered by other interviews. This means lack of generalization, however, it
also provided with various input and viewpoints on several themes.
A theme-based approximation in thread with Thagaard (2009) was used, which means that a
comparison of information was made based on each theme for all informants. The main point
was to attain a deeper understanding for each theme across the study objects, and at the same
time look at similarities and differences. A drawback of an approach like this is the possibility
of losing overview of the totality in the material, since bits of the content is disengaged from
the context. To avoid this, a total impression after the interviews were written down. The
intention was to ensure that a broader perspective was maintained. Also to have the possibility
to look back at the document to see if notes corresponded to the conclusion.
3.4 Quality of the Data
When carrying out this research, an emphasis was made on securing good quality in the data
collected. However, this can be difficult when collecting secondary data. The way to secure
this was to use reliable and acknowledged sources from multiple actors. In the qualitative
interviews, the concepts of reliability and validity is central in the discussion of the research's
credibility (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009; Thagaard, 2009). In the following sections,
there will be a discussion of the quality of the data material.
3.4.1 Reliability
Reliability in connection with qualitative studies is referred to if the research results are
consistent and credible (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009). An important question is whether
alternative researchers using the same methods have similar conclusions (Thagaard, 2009), or
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if the conclusions can be reproduced at another time by other researchers (Kvale and
Brinkmann, 2009).
There are four threats to reliability according to Robson (2002):
Subject or participant faults
Subject or participant bias
Observation faults
Observation bias
Since the informants were chosen with an objective of getting various viewpoints to the
research question, all the informants had different backgrounds. This was to get a broader
overview, and to not get locked in one profession's opinion. However, this means lack of
possibility to support the individual's statements, and also the possibility of not getting correct
results. This was tried solved slightly by including more informants, however, not all
contacted were willing, or had time to participate in an interview.
Observation faults, or bias, can arise when the informants are in situations that is not
consistent with their normal behavior pattern, and hence lead to atypical answers. Observation
faults can arise if informants give inaccurate answers with the purpose of distorting the results
(Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). In this study, secondary data as Statoil reports, or
media coverage with intention to decorating truth, or intention to criticize the company was
considered. Also, the informants could have answered question in a way that does not reflect
reality.
The work was carried out by ensuring that reliability was accounted for through choice of
method, and arguments for why this is chosen. Further, all available sources will be available
in the bibliography. However, there is always a possibility that interpretation and analysis of
data can carry some subjectivity to a certain extent, which can contribute to weakening the
reliability of the thesis.
3.4.1.1 During the Interviews
Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill (2009) argue that the way the interviewer behave during the
interview can create disalignment of how the informant answers the questions. This will
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impair the reliability if it leads to the informant formulates its answers or avoid talking about
important themes.
To get credible answers in this research, open questions were used where it was possible,
since leading questions weakens reliability (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). One factor
that might have had negative influence on the informants, and thereby the data material, was
that I had no interview experience (Johannessen, Kristoffersen and Tufte, 2011), and was
therefore very insecure in the beginning. This might have led to much focus on how to carry
out the interview, instead of focusing about the informant and the theme of the interview
(Kvale and Brinkmann, 2009).
This way, important information could have been lost along the way. However, after a few
telephone interviews this became less stressful. Being aware of these problems before starting
the interview, reading methodical books, and articles helped in this process. Also, since both
questions asked and answers written down simultaneously as the informants answered,
important information could have been lost. In addition, conducting the interviews alone was
a bit challenging.
3.4.1.2 During the Analysis
After the interviews were executed, the answers were transcribed from Norwegian to English.
Since the information collected through the interviews were not taped, and therefore could not
be listened to subsequently, it was important to analyze the findings immediately after the
interview was completed. The answers were structured in a way that information was related
to different themes. In addition, all the data material was structured by giving each informant
a particular color. This was done to keep an overview over which informant said what, when
comparing and gathering all the data material in one document.
The transcription process has great impact on the reliability of the data (Kvale and
Brinkmann, 2009), and was considered when drawing conclusions from the data material.
3.4.2 Validity
Validity is another criteria, which needs consideration to ensure good quality of data. Validity
is about the degree to which the data set generated from the research approach reflect the
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phenomena that it is intended to cover (Piekkari and Welch, 2004).There is a division
between internal and extemal validity. According to Yin (2003), internal validity about
establishing a causal relationship where certain relations can lead to other relations, parted by
other apparent relations. This is often hard to examine, however, through accurate and
thorough documentation of used data this will increase the internal validity. Also, the concept
validity is increased by the choice of the case study. However, because of the study's
limitations, it is no possibility of including all aspects which can influence the research
question. However, these will be mentioned in the conclusion.
External validity is whether the findings in this research can be generalized in other research
settings (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). As mentioned, because of the study's
uniqueness there is no objective of generalizing the results. However, the findings in this
study can, to a certain extent, be transferable if similar cases should arise at a later point.
3.5 Limitations of the Data
There are direct links between the types of data collected, the data collection process, the
interpretation methods, and the chosen research strategy in this research process. In relation to
these links, it is also important to understand the limitations, as well as possible factors
affecting validity and reliability of the research. Failures and mistakes can occur at any time
in the process, from collection of data, processing, analyzing, and the conclusions drawn.
3.5.1 Data Collection
An important weakness in the qualitative analysis is that my perspective and background can
affect choices and interpretation of the text, and lead to an imbalance in selection of texts.
However, a thorough consciousness about this problem has been made throughout the work,
and also choosing to include text showing several viewpoints on the problem.
Further, an observation was made that many of the sources served a certain purpose. Also,
when using Statoil's own reports, careful considerations was made due to these might have
been written for a special purpose, and the possibility of leaving important information due to
the company's reputation. An emphasize has therefore been made to get information from
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recognized sources as the IRIS report, PSA's investigation report, SINTEF report, reports on
measurements of effects, as well as Statoil's viewpoints on the accident and implementation
of initiatives.
3.5.2 Data Sample
The selection in this research is not representative, but strategic, since it is based on few
samples (Lilledahl and Hegnes, 2000). However, even though the findings are not
representative to the population, it can be representative in the categories investigated
(Kunnskapssenteret, 2013b).
Only seven people were interviewed, which leads to limitation regarding collection of enough
support for answering the research question. Also, a question becomes whether the right
people were interviewed. To get more support for the conclusion, more people should have
been interviewed, preferably within the same area of expertise.
There are several drawbacks which are important to highlight when using an interview-guide,
which also made this research demanding. This is for example that vital themes can fall in
between, and that the flexibility can give different answer perspectives, and make comparison
of data difficult (Lilledahl and Hegnes, 2000).
3.5.3 Interpretation Methods and the Chosen Research Strategy
The interpretation methods and the chosen strategy are also important to consider. When
interpreting data, it is always a danger of interpreting from an own point of view. This was
tried solved through using other secondary sources. Further, the research strategy can also
limit the results, since it is no possibility to get statistical generalization when executing the
case study. This was considered when choosing this method, nevertheless, the case study was
considered as suitable.
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4 Empiric Background
The empiric background serves as a foundation for the research carried out in this master's
thesis. A short presentation of the different actors involved will be introduced; including
Statoil, the Snorre A organization, and the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway. In addition,
the main features of Statoil's management system important for solving the thesis will be
deduced. Finally, the Snorre A blow-out and its underlying causes will be presented in form
of the pentagon model.
4.1 Description of the Relevant Organizations
4.1.1 Statoil ASA
Statoil ASA is an international energy-company with 40 years of experience from oil-and gas
production on the Norwegian continental shelf. The headquarters lie in Stavanger, Norway.
Statoil is listed on the stock exchange in New York, and in Oslo (Statoil, 2013b).
"Den norske stats oljeselskap AS", Statoil, was established in 1972. Only two years later, the
Statfjord field was found in the North Sea, and Statoil was the first Norwegian company that
got operator responsibility on a field, on Gullfaks in the North Sea (Statoil, 2013c).
In October 2007, Statoil merged with Hydro's oil and gas activities. The new company got the
temporary name StatoilHydro, and got a size and strength of a comprehensive international
initiative. In November 2009, the company changed its name to Statoil ASA (Statoil, 2013c).
Statoil has been one of the most central actors in Norwegian oil-industry since the early 70s,
and contributed to developing Norway to a modern industrialized country (Statoil, 2013c).
4.1.2 Snorre A
Snorre A is one of Statoil's large oil producing installations on the Norwegian continental
shelf. It is an integrated living quarters, drilling, and production platform, anchored to the
seabed with tension legs, and with two subsea production facilities tied to the installation
(Brattbakk et al., 2005).
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The Snorre A field has a rather turbulent history. It was originally found, developed and
operated by Saga Petroleum in 1992. Saga was a private-owned company, and the smallest of
the three operating Norwegian companies. Throughout the nineties, there were considerable
falling oil prices, and some unfortunate investments and strategic decisions made by Saga.
Saga came into deep economic difficulties, and was in 1999 jointly taken over by Hydro and
Statoil. Hydro and Statoil divided Saga's properties and licenses between them. With the
Snorre field, they found a solution of Hydro being the operator for a two-year period from
2000, where Statoil took over responsibility in 2003 (Schiefloe and Vikland, 2006). Also, at
the end of October same year, Snorre A changed drilling contractors from Prosafe to Odfjell
Drilling. Odfjell Drilling took over about 80% of Prosafe's Snorre A personnel (Brattbakk, et
al., 2005). However, the Snorre A organization, both off- and onshore, was largely kept intact
(Schiefloe and Vikland, 2006).
In the Snorre organization, there is a general perception that Snorre A is one of the Statoil
facilities with the worst HSE rankings/statistics. Already in September 2003 there had been
many notifications regarding four serious incidents at the platform (Brattbakk, et al., 2005).
4.1.3 The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway ensures that the players in the petroleum activities
maintain high standards of health, environment, safety, and emergency preparedness through
stipulation of premises and follow up. The purpose is to contribute to create the greatest
possible value for society (PSA, 2013b).
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway was established in January 2004 as an independent
government regulator. The organization is subordinate to the Ministry of Labor, and has
regulatory responsibility for safety, emergency, preparedness, and the working environment in
the petroleum sector in Norway.
The government has given them following duties:
The PSA will ensure that petroleum activity and activities relating to it are supervised
in a unified manner. This will be done through its own audits and in cooperation with
other regulatory authorities in the HSE area
The PSA should be a contributor of transfer of knowledge from the HSE area to
society in general. This will be done by providing information and advice to the
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companies in the industries, establishing collaborative relationships with other HSE
regulators nationally and internationally.
3. The PSA will provide input to the supervising ministry on issues being dealt with by
that ministry, and support the ministry on issues at request.
4.2 Statoil's Management System
Statoil's management system is a set of principles, policies, processes and requirements that
support the organization in how to reach their objectives. It is about how to get from A to B in
a secure and effective way, and a basic navigation tool intentioned to be used in every area, as
well as under changing circumstances. Beyond the main features of Statoil's management
system, only parts relevant for the research will be discussed here.
"At Statoil, the way we deliver is as important as what we deliver" (Statoil, 2013a).
The management system is documented in governing documentation. This includes the Statoil
Book, common function requirements, and requirements specific to the business area. The
Statoil Book describes the common framework of the management system, and is an
important remedy in the daily operations. It sets standards for how to behave, deliver and
lead. It is clear on what is expected and required from employees, as well as contractors
(Statoil, 2013a).
The management system has three main objectives.
It is supposed to contribute to safe, reliable and efficient operations, and enable
compliance with external and internal requirements.
Incorporate values, people, and leadership principles in every operation.
Support business performance through high-quality decision-making, fast and precise
execution, and continuous learning.
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Figure 4: Statoil's Management System
(Statoil, 2013a)
4.2.1 The Statoil Book
The Statoil Books covers the following topics: Values; guiding behavior, People and
leadership; describing what they expect from people working in the company, Operating
model; describing the organizational principles, the way they work, and the way they manage
and improve performance, and Corporate policies; describing governing bodies, authorities,
internal control, and regulate actions and decisions in important areas.
4.2.1.1 Culture
Culture is an important mechanism to management in Statoil, and is described in the
management system through values, and compliance and leadership principles.
"It is our people who enable us to meet our challenges and deliver on our promises. We need
your skills and personal commitment as well as effective leadership to reach our goals."
(Statoil, 2013a).
Statoil's values are to be courageous, open, hands-on, and caring, which lies at the core of the
management system. These embody the spirit, and energy of the company, and are essential to
succeed over time in a competitive environment. The values drive performance, and provide
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guidance in how to do business, and how to work together with external stakeholders. Statoil
emphasize the importance of having the values in mind when making the right decision. In a
certain situation, this may be to identify possibilities and challenges, to have integrity, to show
engagement and endurance, and to make sure that no accidents happens. It is not acceptable to
make decisions that leads to higher risks, and it is therefore important to clarify the task to
ensure that no shortcuts are made. Performance of employees is not just evaluated on what is
achieved, but also how it is achieved (Statoil, 2013a).
The Compliance and Leadership (former A standard) way of working enables continuous
quality performance delivery. The active use of the management system in the daily work
ensures precision, quality, and learning, to further develop the value-based performance
culture (Statoil, 2013a).
4.2.1.2 Ambition to Action
Ambition to Action is the integrated performance management process at Statoil. Because of
the demanding, dynamic, and unpredictable business environment, a focus is put on
continuous risk evaluation. This, to respond quickly when the unexpected occurs, and when
opportunities or threats arise. Ambition to Action balances alignment of strategic direction
and common business processes, with empowerment and local business responsibility.
4.2.1.3 Operating Principles
People working at Statoil need to comply with the rules and procedures adopted. These create
a common standard for how operations should be carried out. Statoil has five operating
policies that guide behavior, actions, and decisions for the entire company.
Value and performance is created in the combined asset-based and function-based
organization
The organizational entities have clear responsibilities, and two distinctly defined
roles; the line role and the support role
Responsibilities and authorities is established through the process of delegation to
the line role, and through the assignment of tasks to support roles in delivery
entities
A single point of accountability applies
The line role has primacy, and acts in accordance with the management system
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4.2.1.4RiskManagement
Statoilidentifies,evaluates,andmanagesriskin everyactivitytoprovidesafeoperations.In
theriskevaluation,a focusis put onbothup-anddownsideeffectsin everylevelof the
organization.
Monitoringis conductedto managerisk,andto driveperformanceandlearning.It ensures
quality,andefficiencyin howto dobusiness,aswellasthequalityoftheproductsand
servicesprovided.It assurescompliancewiththemanagementsystem,providesas a basisfor
improvement,andis performedby bothinternalandexternalparties.Thescopeandfrequency
of intemalmonitoringdependson anassessmentof risksby linemanagers,processowners,
andcorporatestafffunctions.
4.2.2 Function Requirements and Business Area Requirements
Thefunctionrequirementsdescribestherequirementsforcommonprocessareas,work
processes,andtechnicalrequirements.Businessarearequirementsdescribestheorganization
andtheoperatingmodelforthebusinessareas,andotherorganizationalunits.Businessarea
requirementsalsoincludeslocalgoverningdocumentationrelatedto the commonprocess
areas.
4.2.2.1GoverningDocumentation
Theglobalgoverningdocumentationensuresstandardization,anddeploymentofbestpractice
acrossthe group.Theprocessmodelsandworkflowdiagramsdescribehowthe employees
shouldexecuteworkprocesses,includingrequirementsof theactivities.Theownersof
govemingdocumentationhandleproposalsforimprovementsandapplicationsfor
dispensation.Governingdocumentationis ownedbyprocessowners,or corporatestaff
functions.TheIT toolsin themanagementsystemgiveseasyaccessto governing
documentationthroughEntry.Synergidoesalsofunctionasa sitewhereemployeescan
updateinformationof incidents,andsharingofknowledge.Further,coursesande-leaming
programsareavailablein thecourse-catalogue(Statoil,2013a).
4.2.2.2Arenas
Statoilhas anorganizationalstructurecomposedofbusinessunitswithprocessesacross
functions,andis therebya mixturebetweena functionalandmatrixorganization.Thepurpose
ofthe arenasis to providequalityandconsistencyacrosstheorganizationbeforeimportant
decisionsaremade.Thearenasensurethatdecision-makersunderstandexpectationsforthe
result,thatriskexposureis realistic,andthatdecision-makingmeetstherequirements.
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4.2.2.3 Process Owners
The mentioned business arenas are line organized and process users. Process owners have
been appointed for the significant process areas with a global reach affecting large numbers of
people across the organization, and to support business needs and standardization based on
best practice. Working across the organization, process owners ensure that high operational
standards and functional excellence are achieved. Process owners capture best practice and
lessons learned, and incorporate this into the global work processes (Statoil, 2013a).
4.3 The Snorre A Blow-out and its Underlying Causes
4.3.1 The Snorre A Blow-out
November 28, 2004 a gas blow-out from well P-31A occurred at Snorre A. Gas was detected
on the surface below the platform. Of the 216 people on board, 35 people stayed behind trying
to prevent the blow-out from escalating. The flare continued to burn simultaneously as they
tried to solve the problem, which was a potential ignition source for gas from the sea
(Brattbakk, et al., 2005). Because of the work carried out by these skilled people, they
eventually managed to get the situation under control. This without any human injury, or
environmental damage (Schiefloe and Vikland, 2006).
The PSA characterized this incident as one of the most serious accidents on the Norwegian
continental shelf (Brattbakk, et al., 2005). Only small margins prevented the incident to
develop to a major accident with loss of lives, and environmental destructions (IRIS, 2011).
Serious failures and deficiencies were uncovered in all phases of Statoil's planning and
implementation of operations at Snorre A. The PSA appointed an investigation group, which
identified non-conformities and improvement areas categorized into four areas;
Lack of compliance with goveming documents
Inadequate understanding and implementation of risk assessments
Inadequate management involvement
Violation of well barrier requirement
4.3.2 Analytical Point of Departure
To detect which parts of the management system was not sufficient in 2004, it becomes
important to find out what was lacking in the management system. The variances were found
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by the PSA, however, Schiefloe and Vikland (2007) have analyzed these findings by using the
Pentagon Model presented in chapter 2. This is to get a better overview over which parts of
the management system was not intact when the accident happened.
4.3.2.1 Formal Structure
Schiefloe and Vikland (2006) found two sets of formal factors having vital significance on the
weakening of the safety barriers. The first comprise the three organizational changes, while
the other is about the governing documentation. None of the three change processes were of
dramatic character; however, the joint effect was a temporary weakening of the Snorre
organization, especially in relation to planning and surveillance of technical demanding and
complex operations (Schiefloe and Vikland, 2007).
The first set of organizational processes has to do with the shifting of operators, from Saga, to
Hydro, and Statoil. Although this was done "by the book", hence giving those who wanted a
possibility to continue in their old jobs, the processes was strenuous to the organization. This
was due to people adjusting to new managers, new data-systems, and governing regulations.
In the last organizational change, from Hydro to Statoil, there was a clear message from the
organization of wanting to be "left alone". This was noticed by management at Statoil, and
therefore only minor changes of operating practices were done the first two years (Schiefloe
and Vikland, 2006).
The second set of changes took place in the well, drilling, and underground departments
onshore. When Saga was operator, as well as Hydro, the activities were organized in two
different sections; one for petroleum technologies and geological analysis, and one for drilling
and well operations. Statoil's practices were different, and the two sections therefore merged
and named RESU (reservoir and underground technologies). This led to new ways of
cooperating and coordinating activities, as well as new working procedures. In addition, a
reorganization compromising all Statoil RESU activities in the Tampen area were made. The
purpose was to get a better use of the combined competence and resources in these extremely
specialized groups of geologists and engineers. This meant that the Snorre organization had to
adapt to another set of leaders, and to a new professional environment. Also, heavy burdens of
work and much responsibility on a few experienced leaders brought the Snorre A RESU out
of balance (Schiefloe and Vikland, 2006).
The third set of changes took place in the drilling department at Snorre A. The drilling
operations were outsourced to firms specializing in these kinds of activities. On November 1,
2004 there was a change of drilling operator, since the earlier bidder lost a renewal of the
46
contract. Norwegian labor laws states that employees in such situations have the right to
continue their jobs, which most of the workforce did. However, they had to adjust to a new set
of leaders, and some new formal regulations. These adjustments took time and meant extra
work. It also drew some attention away from the daily work processes. None of these change
processes were dramatic, however, the combined effect was an overall weakening of the
Snorre A organization. This was especially concerning planning and monitoring of technically
complex and demanding well operations (Schiefloe and Vikland, 2006).
A general discovery made by Schiefloe and Vikland (2006) in the official investigation report,
were many violations in using the governing documentation. This was a distinct subject under
the collection of data. A thorough finding was an explicit loyalty to the regulation. The
employees did understand the importance of the regulations, and there were nothing implying
that rules were broken intentionally. At the same time, many were of the opinion that the
regulations were too comprehensive and difficult to follow, and that parts of it was too
detailed and specialized. Sometimes it was also difficult to divide between absolute demands,
and what was guiding parameters. Hence, the knowledge of the regulations were varying, and
some of the informants told that they could not guarantee to have full overview over all the
rules they had to comply with. The governing documentation was systematic organized in
databases that were easy to use for experts. However, not everyone was comfortable with use
of computer equipment, and that complicated the situation further for those working off shore.
These employees work to weeks on and four weeks off, and thereby four weeks until next
time logging on to the database. At the same time, there were continuous extensions,
specifications, changes, and updates assumed they had knowledge about (Schiefloe and
Vikland, 2007).
4.3.2.2 Culture
Snorre A was the only installation operated by the former Saga Petroleum. Throughout the
history, there had been a high degree of personnel stability and limited turnover. Being as an
island by itself, it came to develop a relatively marked internal culture. There are some
aspects of this culture which is of special interest. Firstly, the working environment was
characterized by a feeling of internal solidarity, with people having a strong and expressed
identification with the organization (Schiefloe and Vikland, 2007). A positive effect was a
motivation of doing a good job, and keep production going, in spite of many technical
challenges. The informal climate was friendly and including. The employees felt an
identification with the installation and colleagues, which also was proven when people
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volunteered to remain on board to fight the blow-out. No one was forced to stay, or would
have been criticized if they had evacuated the platform. Still, they wanted to get the situation
under control together with their colleagues. Those evacuated also said they wanted to stay
and contribute, since they did not want their friends to take the risk alone (Schiefloe and
Vikland, 2006).
To find the time to develop competencies concerning systematic risk assessment has been
demanding. Due to limited size of the onshore organization, the number of experienced
technical personnel was limited, thereby depending on a few persons. Snorre has had a
history of few authoritarian leaders in the Saga period, which influenced the climate for
internal criticism in a negative way. There was also a high risk tolerance at Snorre. They
never felt they took chances, but as many of the findings demonstrates, they did (Schiefloe
and Vikland, 2006).
4.3.2.3 Interaction
Both Statoil and Hydro have a clear policy regarding safe operations, which is demonstrated
through an extensive reporting system for incidents, and near incidents. When something
happen, both personal injury and teclmical break-downs, precautions shall be taken and
reported. However, practicing the ideals were sometimes difficult. This was because of a
continuous pressure to keep up production, a scarcity of time, diverted attention from leaders,
and because of difficult consideration in decision-making. From the outside, the working
processes can be characterized as shifting towards a risk-prone practice (Schiefloe and
Vikland, 2006). The work program was often completed immediately before execution, and
the leaders had small possibilities of controlling the work that was done at the land
organization. They were used to "trusting the experts" (Schiefloe and Vikland, 2007).
Interaction between the on- and offshore organization also had a historical dimension. The
interviews showed evidence of negative experiences when people at the platform came with
critical notations, or questions to assessments made by those working onshore. Attitudes that
the safest thing was to keep quiet, and do what was told, had survived through the change of
operators. This, in spite of clear messages from management in Statoil; "If there is any doubt
about circumstances of safety critical character, the work is to be stopped, irrespective of
costs" (Schiefloe and Vikland, 2007).
4.3.2.4 Relations and Networks
The day when the blow-out occurred, Snorre A had been a part of Statoil in almost two years.
In the organizational map, the installation was placed in the Tampen area in DPN equally to
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all the other Statoil operated platforms. However, the organizational map did not tell the
whole truth. As a consequence of the decision of keeping the Snorre organization relatively
intact after the change of operators, Snorre A was in another situation than the other fields.
Those working at Snorre, had a background from Snorre Petroleum, and was not in the same
way informal and social integrated in the bigger operating organization. Few leaders had
come from Statoil, and there were weak informal and loyal bonds coupling the Snorre
employees together with their new colleagues in other parts of Statoil (Schiefloe and Vikland,
2007). In addition, there was not sufficient contact or cooperation with the neighbor
installation Snorre B (Schiefloe and Vikland, 2006).
Contemplated in a network perspective, Snorre A appeared as a relatively isolated unit. This
made Snorre A a different installation. This is since one of the characteristics with Statoil is
the extensive, informal networks which couple people together in various parts of the
company. This far-reaching network is to a large extent a bi-product of Statoil's rotational
policy, which means that most employees change place of work with a few years of interval.
This is especially for leaders and specialists (Schiefloe and Vikland, 2007).
In the process leading to the blow-out, those working at Snorre RESU had few possibilities of
making use of the informal professional relations to get advice, or to discuss alternative
technical solutions for the actual well operation (Schiefloe and Vikland, 2006). This special
operation had not been experienced before. However, later they realized that they had carried
out a similar operations a few years earlier, and that they both had experience and the correct
equipment necessary. After the blow-out was stopped, and the situation was normalized,
many professionals from other parts of Statoil came to help. One of the informants said they
did not know that so much experience and expertise was available at Statoil (Schiefloe and
Vikland, 2007).
4.3.2.5 Technology
The technological standard at the platform had been gradually deteriorated due to long-time
wear-and-tear, lack of maintenance, and limited redundancies. The investments had been kept
to a minimum, which resulted in an incident-driven mode of working (Schiefloe and Vikland,
2007). "Continuous fire-fighting" was an expression used to describe the daily working
situation for those working at the platform, both regarding operations and technical
maintenance. A consequence of this was lack of possibilities of long-tenn planning and
systematic work on the technical installation. However, it also led to a well-developed ability
to improvise in any situation. The Snorre A crew could handle almost any technical challenge,
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whichalsocameto playa decisiveroleinhandlingthesituationwhentheblow-outoccurred
(SchiefloeandVikland,2006).
Theexplanationfor thestateof technologywasfoundin theplatform'sturbulenthistory,as
wellas theproblematiceconomicsituationof the firstoperatorof thefield,SagaPetroleum
(SchiefloeandVikland,2007). Sagatriedto keepcostsdown,andat thesametimekeeping
productionat a highestlevelpossible.Thisdidof courseinfluencetheworkpractices,and
createda tolerancefortakinga fewshort-cutswhenit wasconsiderednecessary.This
situationwasnot influencedmuchduringthetwoyearsHydrowasoperator.WhenStatoil
tookovertheresponsibilityin 2003,plansweremadefora technicalupgrade,buthadnot
comeveryfarby November2004(SchiefloeandVikland,2006).
4.3.2.6TheBarriersinthe Organization
SchiefloeandVikland(2007)haveexaminedhowthesoftmechanisms,or moreprecisely,the
organizationalsafetybarriersfunctionandgroupedthemin twodimensions,accordingto
characterandfunction.
Thefirstdimensionis dividedbetweenbarriersof formalandinformalcharacter.Theformal
barriersis everytypeofdecisionandarrangementhatis integratedin goveming
documentation,includingworkprocessesinstructions.Theinformalbarriersincludesafety
relatedinteractionsthatis notregulatedbythesemechanisms,whichaffectshowthingsare
doneandprovidesas mechanismsforqualitycontrol.Mechanismsof thefirsttypesecurethat
worktasksaredoneina secureandrightway.Theothertypeimpliesextraconsiderationof
safetybeforea criticaltaskis initiated(SchiefloeandVikland,2007).Thisis explainedin
Figure5:
Formal mechanisms Informal mechanisms
Doing the right
things
Quality control
Figure 5: Formal and informal mechanisms
(Schiefloe and Vikland, 2007)
1 2
3 4
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The reduced organizational robustness in the Snorre organization can be explained in forms of
weaknesses in all these categories in the table. The failure of following the decisions of
governing documentation can be placed in category 1. This was partially due to the
complexity and availability of the documentation (Schiefloe and Vikland, 2007).
Lack of management involvement and lack of control of the well program can be placed in
category 2. The main explanation is the work-load placed on leaders, the general
administrative operations and the comprehensive changes that the organization went through
(Schiefloe and Vikland, 2007).
The misjudgment in the planning process can be placed in category 3. The underlying causes
had to do with the developed work practice. At the same time, the relative isolation in relation
to the informal networks in Statoil meant that they did not have sufficient access to extemal
expertise and counselling (Schiefloe and Vikland, 2007).
The gradual increase of risk tolerance, in combination with the experience of stress and
pressure on production, were features characterizing the organization. In all, this led to a
relative low degree of informal control of the work practice internal in the organization. These
factors can be placed in category 4 (Schiefloe and Vikland, 2007).
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5 Results
In this chapter, the results from the interviews are presented. They are organized accordingly
to the four questions presented in chapter 1:
Has Statoil managed to comply with the requirements imposed by the Petroleum
Safety Authority Norway after the Snorre A accident?
What changes have been made in Statoil's management system since 2004?
To what extent has learning from the Snorre A accident led to changes in the
management control system?
Does the current management control system ensure safety?
Under each of these four parts, there are questions related to the interviews conducted. These
answers will give contribution to the further discussion in chapter 6. In chapter 6, results from
secondary sources will also be presented and discussed together with the results presented in
this chapter. In all, this will make the foundation for the conclusion in chapter 7
5.1 Has Statoil Managed to Comply with the Requirements Imposed by the
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway after the Snorre A Accident?
The investigations reports are important tools to uncover faults, shortcomings, and
improvement areas. This may contribute to prevent such accidents in the future. When the
PSA investigate, their focus is to uncover variances that Statoil must close. When Statoil
investigate themselves, this is followed up by proposed initiatives. Initiatives are therefore
composed by Statoil's initiatives after own investigation, and initiatives which contributes of
closing variances indicated by the PSA (IRIS, 2011).
5.1.1 The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway's Contribution to Prevention of
Accidents
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway carries out supervision of the petroleum industry in
Norway. The organization has different teams, where there is an own supervision team for
off- and onshore divisions. The PSA's main priorities is based on the risk level at the
Norwegian continental shelf, history, what is happening international, and other accidents.
The organization collects information by supervising, go out on offshore installations, carry
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out interviews, and measure activities to see if there are any variances. Based on this
information, aspects to be emphasize further are found.
The PSA can employ means to get things done. Sometimes, parts of the organization shows
good results, while other parts has bad ones. Operations can be stopped if necessary, and
impositions can be given—which was done at Snorre A.
A question to be asked is whether, or how, they can employ impositions on Statoil to improve
safety, and prevent similar accidents from happening. There is proof of a so-called "tiredness
of initiatives". From the interviews with the PSA, it was obvious that they are conscious about
this. They stated that it is important to call attention to defects and shortages, but also to
contribute to implementing good initiatives. Without sufficient time, they can stress the
organization.
5.1.2 Are Every Point from the Investigation Report Closed in a Good Way? Has Statoil
Managed to Comply with These Requirements?
The report of initiatives by Statoil after the accident, which was dated 30 November 2005,
constitutes the foundation of the description of initiatives that was proposed after the gas
blow-out at Snorre A. The report of initiatives contains eight measures implemented by
November 2006, whereas half of them directly aligned to conditions at Snorre A. The other
four was more of a general character. IRIS (2011) considered the initiatives as being of
primary interest. The process of implementation went well, and the different initiatives got
one "sponsor" each at different units. Every initiative was implemented, and some were also
pursued to other measures. Many of them also had significance beyond the two years of the
evaluation.
The informants from the PSA highlighted that Statoil put a lot of effort to find the causes of
the accident, and to close the variances. They had frequent meetings with Statoil the following
year. Statoil also got a lot of extra work due to initiatives not being fully covered, and they
worked for a long time since many of them were not easy to close. In addition, Statoil
struggled to measure what effect the initiatives have had on the company. They did not come
up with a good way of doing this, hence the PSA closed all variances in 2005.
However, after the initiatives had been implemented, Snorre A was one of the better
installations in the company. Other parts of the company struggled more, as for example
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GullfaksC. TheGullfaksC installationexperiencedan accidentin2010withmanyof the
sameunderlyingcausesastheSnorreA accident.Thiswasdueto difficultiesof closing
variancesthroughoutthe company,andthe intemalinitiativesafterthe SnorreA accidentnot
havingsufficientanchoringin therestof the organization.
5.2 What Changes Have Been Made in Statoil's Management System since
2004?
5.2.1 What Has Changed in Statoil's Management System since 2004?
Statoil'smanagementsystemhasgonethroughmanychangessince2004.It hasgonefrom
DocMap,viaAPOS,to thenewsystemARIS.DocMapwasthesysteminuseat the timeof
the SnorreA accident,andwasconsideredas bothersometo many.WhenStatoilandHydro
merged,theystartedtouseHydro'ssystemAPOS.Statoilwascharacterizedas a "loose"
companybeforethe merger,in comparisonto Hydro'smoremilitantmanagementsystem.
Statoilhasnowgoneoverto thenewsystemARIS,whichis muchmoresimplified,with
easiersearchmethods.
OneinformantfromNTNUsaidthatStatoil'sformermanagementsystemwascharacterized
by verycomplexprocedures.Thiswasalsocommunicatedby employees,whofoundthe
systemhardto understand.Thegoverningdocumentationwasconstructedbyprofessionals,
whichoftenled to difficultlanguagebeingused,andemployeesnotalwaysunderstandingthe
documentation.In addition,noteveryonewascomfortableinreadingEnglish.Synergywas
alsoa problemfor many,andwasnot experiencedas suitable.
Further,theheadofprocessdrillingmaintainedthatoperationsweredocument-oriented,
whereassignmentsanddifferentworkoperationswereeithertoolittle,or toomuchdefined.
Theworkerswerenot engagedbyprocedures,muchbecauseofthislackofunderstanding,
andnotwantingto askco-workerseverytimea problemarose.Thisledto manyexecuting
operationsin ownterms,andmuchconfusionamongthemembersof theorganization.This
werealsosomeof theunderlyingreasonsforthe SnorreA accident.Hence,theconstruction
of themanagementsystemturnedouttobe a greatproblem.
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ThePSAclarifiedthatwhentheaccidenthappenedin2004,themanagementsystemwas
alreadythrougha change.Accordingly,thesystemdidnotchangejust becauseof the Snorre
A accident;however,theaccidentwasa contributorof initiatives,andimprovements.
ThePSAsaidtheyfeelStatoilhasdonea considerablesimplificationof themanagement
system,cleanedup in theirdocuments,andmadeit moreuser-friendly.Regardingchange
management,theyalsosaidthattheworkprocesseshavebeenmadelesscomplex,implying
theyaremoreeasyto relateto. Theheadofprocessdrillingat Statoiladdedthattoday's
systemis moredeveloped.It hasgonefrombeingdocument-orientedto processoriented.
Theseprocessesdescribehowtoperformtasks.
TheinformantfromtheSnorreAplatformpointedoutthatthegoverningdocumentationin
themanagementsystemhashadsufficientimprovement.ThetoolsregardingHSEhavealso
gonethrougha clean-upoperation.In addition,manychangeshavebeenimplementedto
improveSynergi'sreportfunction.
However,oneof the informantsfromNTNUmentionedthatStatoilhasbecomea littletoo
"military".Therearetoorigidlines,muchbecauseeverythinghastobe definedin formof
workorders. TheSarbanesOxleyAct(SOX)regulationof2002wasemphasizedas a
significantcontributor.Thiswasa billenactedas a reactionto themanycorporateand
accountingscandalsincludingEnron,TycoInternationalandWorldCom.Thisact
implementednewlegislationforthosepresentat theNewYorkStockExchange.Thiswas
donebecausemanycompaniesmanipulatedinformation.Afterthisactwasactuated,
everythingmustbe formalizedandtraceable.Thisrequiresverystrictrevision,sinceit should
be possibleto trackeverydecision,andeveryactionwhichtheemployeeundertakes.The
employeeshaveto documenthisthroughcomputersystems.A strengthwiththissystemis a
clearandevidentdistributionofresponsibility,howeverweaknessesarea morebureaucratic
organization,lessflexibility,andthatit doesnottakevariationsbetweeninstallationsinto
consideration.However,ARISismuchbetterthanthechaosthatsubsistedbefore.
ThePSAclaimedthattoday,Statoilhasevidentobjectivesofwhatis supposedtobe done.
Forexample,throughimplementationof standardizationto ensurethatprocessesandtasksare
managedin the samewaythroughouthe company.Thisjointlyoperationalmodelisusedin
theirdailywork. Now,thereisharmonization,standardizationofprocesses,andinternal
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requirements. For example, DPN and TTD is two different divisions of the organization, but
work according to the same standards. This is also supported by the informant working at the
Snorre A platform.
The land Chief at Snorre A has made a commented about the management system being under
continuous development, with an objective of avoiding accidents. This is based on internal
and external experience. However, no one can guarantee anything. The informants from the
PSA said they think Statoil is on the right path, and that the company steers changes in a good
matmer. This is also what both management, and those working throughout in the
organization are saying. There have been comprehensive work in the entire organization.
However, which effect this will have is hard to say now. Changes are not done overnight, and
remains therefore only to be seen in posterity if they have positive effects.
5.3 To What Extent Has Learning from the Snorre A Accident Led to Changes in
the Management System?
The investigations from both the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway, and internal
investigations at Statoil have revealed variances that need to be closed after the Snorre A
accident. Learning becomes subject to which degree, and how, Statoil has learned from public
reactions and own experiences from the accident. This involves changing systems, behavior
and routines.
5.3.1 What Changes Have Been Made in the Management System in Relation to
Learning from the Accident?
The PSA described in the interview that Statoil has put down a lot of effort and resources to
improve the organization since the accident in 2004. This includes, among other things, the
new management system ARIS, simplification of governing documentation, and the jointly
processes which should secure safe operations. In addition, there have been a reorganization
of drilling and well operations. The employee at the Snorre A platform supplement this by
saying that Statoil did a fantastic job after the accident. There were many initiatives
throughout the company to improve the organization.
The head of process drilling said that the Synergi report showed good results of Statoil's
learning after the accident. There were more focus on distinct operations governing every
installation. However, he asserted that when initiatives are implemented, there must also exist
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goodsolutionsfor carryingthemout.Wheninitiativesareimplemented,thereis alwaysmuch
focusaroundit, nevertheless,it isnotcertainthateveryoneunderstandsit.Theresearchers
fromNTNUinvestigatingthe accident,ontheotherhand,saidthattheleamingeffectvaries
throughouthe organization.
Nevertheless,afterthe SnorreA accidentin2004,therehavebeenseveralaccidents.This
includesthe accidentat GullfaksC,whichprovedto havemanyof thesameunderlying
causes.Thiswas impliedin interviewsfromseveralofthe informants,whichsaidthatthere
aremanysignsthatStatoilhavenot leamedsomuchaftertheaccident.GullfaksC alsohada
distinctculture,andtheydidnotmanageto usegoverningdocumentationcorrectly.This,due
to all the initiativesbeingimplemented.
Theinformantworkingat theSnorreAplatformclarifiedthatthereismuchmorefocuson
safetythroughthe managementsystemtoday.Thisincludesmoresimplifiedoperations,anda
considerablefocusonlearningfromexperience.Managementandleadershaveputhigh
pressureon ensuringsafeoperations,andmakingsureemployeesunderstandtheimportance
of complying.
ThePSAhas closedthevariancesfrombothSnorreA andGullfaksC. Statoilputa lot of
effortdownto closethesevariances,however,thereareno guaranteesthateverypersonat
Statoilworkaccordingto theA-standard(ComplianceandLeadership).Manypeopleare
workingat Statoil,someof themcanmakeshortcuts,andculturescandevelop.Whatleaders
bothsayanddo in thismatterhavea lotto sayforthisdevelopment.Leadersmusttake
responsibility,andpreventsuchthingsfromhappening.
TheLandChiefat SnorreA commentedthatStatoilis of theopinionthattheyhavelearned
fromthe accident,evenif everyaccidentin thefuturecanchallengethatopinion.ThePSA
endedthisby saying"onlytimewillshowif thechangeshavebeensufficient".
5.3.2 Are There any Features Regarding the Management System and/or Attitudes
Today That Differs from 2004, and Thereby CanAffect Prevention of Accidents?
ThePSAsaidthatthereareevidentdifferencesfrombothmanagement,andthoseworkingin
therest of the organizationtoday.Thiswasalsoconfirmedby thepersonworkingat the
SnorreA platform.Therehavebeena considerablechangeofbehavior,andattitudein
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comparison to 2004. Before, the equipment was only checked and maintained in "in every
year of jubilee". Also, it was a tendency of carrying out operations in an "American way", and
a culture prevailing where there was a "king on top". The informant from NTNU
complemented this by saying that there was a fear of bringing up sensitive subjects, and that
management had a fixed and clear mindset.
Generally, there have been major changes in Statoil since 2004, including a completely
different way of thinking. This is demonstrated through a higher management focus, and
standardization of procedures. The other informant from NTNU also stated that there are
more focus on the behavior of the employee, and focus on compliance.
The land Chief at Snorre A commented that the management system is under continuous
development, and improvement. The difference from 2004 is that the management system is
process-oriented. Also, a great difference is a higher focus on major accidents.
The PSA said that Statoil has a clear plan of action, indicated through The Statoil book. There
are also clear signs with compliance to the A standard (Compliance and Leadership).
Everyone working in the company, as well as contractors, must work according to this
standard. This ensures risk evaluation before tasks are initiated.
Statoil has always had procedures controlling how they manage business. These are
continuously changing, according to the changing environment. One of the informants from
the PSA says that when in meetings with Statoil, they have always been very convincing
about what they are doing is the right way. When there is a new way of carrying out
procedures, these are regarded the best way at that moment. Now, the A-standard is popular.
The person from the Snorre A platform said that they are more restrained by requirements,
and following governing documentation today. They do not have the freedom of solving
problems theirselves anymore. In every situation, they have to stop and evaluate if the process
is not mentioned in the governing documentation. They also have pre-work meetings where
they gather everyone, and go through the plan and operations.
The PSA said that what is important, is to get everyone to comply with the standards, and how
to carry out operations best way possible. There have been much focus on A-standard
(Compliance and Leadership) in Statoil, however only time can tell if it will be successful.
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5.3.3 How is the Safety-culture at Snorre A Today Versus Ten Years Ago With Respect
to Understanding/Use of the Management System?
One of the informants from NTNU remarked that the culture at Snorre A was one of the
underlying factors of the accident happening at the installation. Most people working at
Snorre A had been employed at Saga. This culture was characterized by "living on the edge".
The employees showed great flexibility and cleverness, however, they were "butterfingered".
Interdisciplinary communities were prevailing, which wanted to have their subjects alone. The
PSA also said that people were doing things in their own way. However, when the accident
happened, the informant from Snorre A mentioned these characteristics as the reason why
they managed to solve the problem and get control over the situation.
The PSA stated that Snorre A have contributed to increasing learning in the organization, but
that this incident alone has not lead to all the changes in Statoil. The accident at Gullfaks C,
and Macondo, also had many of the same underlying causes as Snorre A. Hence, there have
been important change processes after both these incidents. This includes changes in
personnel; new people entering the organization, as well as rotation on the platforms. Also,
changes have been done in accordance with resources, capacity and knowledge. In total,
Snorre A, Gullfaks C, and Macondo have made major accidents and safety a high priority in
the PSA's agenda. Statoil has followed very thoroughly, and done a lot to prevent accidents
like these from happening again. However, Statoil is a large organization, and it can be
difficult to implement changes in the entire organization.
The head of process drilling stated that, with the reorganization, many employees said that
installations would blow up owing to this. Statoil listened, but carried out the reorganization
anyhow. The "king on top" culture was removed, and this ensured that special cultures were
not created. Accordingly, there have been more focus on building a good culture throughout
the company. This is important to provide safe operations in the organization. However, he
said that regardless of how much effort is put in building new cultures, people are individuals.
Individuals make own decisions and can deviate from the rest of the employees. The PSA also
said that Statoil has done many things to break the culture existing at Snorre A. Further, the
head of process drilling said that there are always people who do not want change. This
restructuring has not proven to give major accidents at the Snorre A platform, yet.
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Following,theheadofprocesscontrolassertedthatthemanagementsystemis more
developedtoday.Thisis alsotruefortheHSEfocus.HSEwasverysimplein 2004,wherethe
onlyrestrictionswereto rememberglasses,gloves,andprotectiveequipment.Afterthemany
accidentsrecently,HSEhavegottena muchhigherpriority.Inaddition,the installationshave
a higherstatus.
Thelandchiefat SnorreA saidthattoday,SnorreA is anintegratedpartof Statoil.In2004,
SnorrehadgonefromSaga,viaHydro,andonlybeena partof Statoilforabouta year.The
workerfromthe SnorreA platformis of theopinionthattheyhavea goodculturetoday.It is
likeeveryotherwork-place,it dependsonthepeoplewhoworkthere,andwhatenvironment
theycreate.Theyalsousethemanagementsystemin everyprocesstheydo,andexperiencesa
higherfocuson safety.
5. 4 Does the Current Management System Ensure Safety?
5.4.11s the Management System Improyed Such That it is Less Likely for Accidents to
Happen Today?
Oneof the informantsfromNTNUTstatedthat"tohavea goodmanagementsystemis
important".Thisis relatedto safety,especiallyinverycomplexorganizations.However,
operationalmodels,the organization,anditsstructurecanalsobe a weaknesses.Thisshows
the importanceof lookingupontheorganizationas a whole,sincetherearemanyfactors
affectingonesingleincident.Theremustbea connectionbetweenstructure,cooperation,and
the managementsystem.Inaddition,sufficientrainingmustbeprovided.
Theinformantworkingat the SnorreA platformsaidthattherearemuchmorefocusonsafety
throughthemanagementsystemtoday.Operationsaremoresimplified,andthereis a
considerablefocuson learningfromexperience.Managementandleadershaveputhigh
pressureon ensuringsafeoperations,andmakingsureemployeesunderstandtheimportance
of complying.TheyworkafterthesocalledA standard(ComplianceandLeadership).This
meansthattheyfirsthaveto definethetaskin governingdocumentation,assessthe task,
evaluate,andpossiblycorrectgoverningdocumentationif thisisneeded.Muchof thework
doneis routine-based,andtherebyrepeatedoverandoveragain.If therearenewtasksthat
needsto be done,theyusemoretimetomakesuretheoperationis donecorrectly,andin
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accordance with governing documentation. He thinks that the management system prevailing
today is great, as long as everyone complies with it. Those who do not comply with governing
documentation and the management system have nothing to do at the platform. It requires
much attention, and hard work to be familiar with the system, but when this has been done, it
is all right to use it. Due to this, he stated that accidents have been minimized, which also
includes other platforms.
The informant from NTNU said it is important for the organization to focus on being resilient.
This means to lay ahead of problems that can arise. A management system can prevent
accidents from happening, but it is important to see this in context, and how management is
carried out. The management system must have anchorage in the organization, in addition to
hold clever people, and right competence.
5.4.2 How are Barriers Secured?
The informant from the Snorre A platform said that the accident in 2004 happened because of
barriers not function as it should. In addition, people working at the Snorre A land
organization, as well as leaders at the platform did not evaluate risk.
Today, the PSA is heavily involved by securing that barriers work as they should. Regulations
are the foundation for how the PSA governs. There are concrete requirements for well and
drilling, and the safety-level requirements that needs to be followed and complied with.
Statoil must also work according to the NORSOK standards, which also serves as
requirements.
The PSA said that barriers are secured through the management system. There are
requirements for everything; the management system, management regulations, and
requirements for activity and organization. As the PSA stated "It is important to avoid holes
in the cheese", which is secured through barriers. In a well there are requirements of two
independent barriers.
One of the informants from NTNU believes that accidents can happen regardless of these
barriers being present. People do not do mistakes on purpose, and many barriers can fail.
There are different scales of accidents, both large and smaller ones. However, a good
framework, and evident leadership have a major influence.
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5.4.3 How Should Leaders Train the Employees at Snorre A to Secure That the
Organization Use Best Practice (Management System) Versus What They Did Before?
The informant from Snorre A said that Saga and Hydro were more concerned about profits,
and did not think so much about maintenance at the Snorre A platform. Statoil took over a
"decayed nest", and became the responsible company when the accident happened. Many
things were not how it was supposed to be at that time.
The informants from the PSA said that there is a higher focus on doing things in practice
today. Especially regarding the planning process. Now, there is a group in every
organizational segment that deals with planning. The involved also get training on how to
plan, and how to interact. When projects are executed the right experts are involved, as well
as leaders on the right level. This has been an evident improvement in the later years.
At the platform, the informant said there are a lot of training and exercises every time they are
back at the platform. This is for example through mustering in lifeboats. There are
requirements of how fast procedures must be done. Overall, there have only been few alarms,
where they have done this, in addition to the required mustering per trip. However, if
something happen, they have to report it in Synergi. This system provides possibilities to
share knowledge and, and to search for other relevant things, trends, and the like.
The land Chief at Snorre A commented that training is provided continuously through their
training center on safety critical processes, in addition to the departments. Several programs
for employees using best practice have been carried out. One of the informants from NTNU
mentioned some of these; the Colleague Program from 2006, and the campaign on falling
objects. There were much attention drawn to these; presentation were held, and leaders came
around in the company to secure compliance.
5.4.4 Have Operations Become Safer?
There are different external conditions for Statoil today, than what was instance in 2004.
Currently, there is more activity, more oil-rigs, more national- and international companies,
and a different approach of getting the right competence.
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The head of process drilling is of the opinion that things are continuously improving, and
going towards the better. The informant from NTNU also claimed that the general picture is
that safety has gotten better. The HSE requirements are more strict. Also, every incident and
accident are reported through Synergi. These are measured, in addition to many systems
trying to prevent accidents and breakdowns from happening.
Computer systems are better and more powerful, and have a greater degree of ability to follow
up activities. The informant from the Snorre A platform also asserted that technology is much
better today. This includes for example transfer of knowledge, reporting of accidents,
vibration-measurement, and the like. These things were not much used before. In 2004,
machines and tools were used until it did not work anymore. Today, there is more knowledge,
as well as sensors giving indication of replacement a long time before it actually is needed.
These sensors monitor the processes, control that everything is done correctly, and that
technical equipment is in its right shape.
The PSA does not expect a risk level of zero, since there always will be some risk in an
industry like this. Trends show that the number of accidents is fluctuating. If one compare for
example the level 30 years ago, there is a lower degree of accidents. A fact is that accidents
are repeated, meaning they often have the same underlying consequences. This was true for
the Gullfaks C accident, and the Macondo accident.
Statoil has had several change projects since 2004. The company has since then also merged
with Hydro. Change puts a different focus to management, and do often lead to unwanted, and
unexpected consequences. There have been both internal and external changes, which affects
the company and safety aspects. However, there is now focus on harmonization and
standardization, and having the same operational model throughout the company.
5.5 Aspects of the Future
5.5.1 Why Are So Many Accidents Still Happening?
The informant from the Snorre A installation said that there are still many accidents today.
However, there are more oilrigs, more people, and thereby many small accidents happening.
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Sometimes, and unfortunately also major ones. However, he feels safe when working at the
oil platforms. "You just have to trust others doing the right things".
The head of process drilling said that "It is likely, or not unlikely that accidents will happen
again". Statoil works continuously to prevent accidents from happening. It becomes
important to follow through with every technical error that happens. Also, he means that as
long as one depends on human for operations to be safe, there will always be a probability of
something happening again. There are many barriers to provide accidents from not happening.
Nevertheless, many barriers can be forgotten, as well as someone putting wrong data in the
systems. He said that currently, they try to make technology with the intention to avoid human
interaction as little as possible. With all these new developments and innovations, it becomes
important to make sure that these will not introduce something new and dangerous. However,
people are for the most part needed to control these systems. He often experiences coming
with new equipment, and employees not understanding the technology behind it when it is
implemented. Introductory courses are always offered, but some may not pay so much
attention, and that can lead to mistakes being done. The informant from NTNU also
mentioned this. It is often stated that human are the reason for accidents happening. Their
actions are affected by choices, individual baggage, decisions, and how the work-day is
carried out. However, individuals are always in a bigger context. This means that it is not just
their actions or mistakes that affects why accidents are happening. Therefore, it can be
difficult to find out what are human or technological mistakes.
5.5.2 Where to Go from Here?
The PSA said that in Norway, there are other systems and regulations than in for example the
USA. Still, there are many similarities between accidents happening in Norway and in the
USA. This is visible through the Snorre A accident, Gullfaks C accident, and the Macondo
accident.
Currently, the petroleum industry is characterized by high activity. Also, there is a focus on
efficiency. Therefore, it becomes important that those setting premises have an understanding
of this —for example those who manage budgets and time. These must also have the sufficient
knowledge in the planning phase, and when carrying out operations. It is also important to
have good parameters and frames from management and through the management system.
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ThePSAassertedthattheremustbehighfocuson gettingtherightcompetence,and
sufficientcapacityin thefuture.Statoilcannotjust implementnewthings,forexample
governingdocumentation,withouttrainingpeople.Thiswillbe especiallyimportantwiththe
increasedactivityin theindustry.It is a high-riskbusiness,anditbecomesimportanto havea
continuousfocusonmeasuring,andmanagingandcontrollingrisk.Thisis especiallyvital
withinHSE.
An informantfromNTNUis of theopinionthatStatoilis stillcharacterizedas a bureaucratic
organization.Therehavebeenmanychangessince2004,forexamplea newoperatingmodel,
andstandardizationof workprocess.Nevertheless,hebelievesthatthisis wrong,becausethe
organizationgetsweakerwhenit comesto professions.Thestandardization,and
harmonizationof activitiescanbe advantageousin somesituations,however,everyplatform
is different,andonelosescompetencein eachprofession.
Anotherof the informantsfromNTNUsaidthatit is currentlyanincreasingbeliefin
measuringeverything,andusingkeyperformanceindicators(KPI)in everysituation.Thisis
not alwayssuitable,sincenoteverythingcanbe measuredby KPIs.Hence,theremustbe an
emphasisto shiftfocusfromonlyusingthese,andto ratheruseindirecttools.In thismatter,it
becomesimportantput asidesufficientime,maturation,andrevision.Actionsmustbe
repeatedandconcretized,aswellasestablishinga consciousnessthroughouthecompany.
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6 Discussion
The discussion chapter will use the results from the interviews presented in chapter 5, together
with findings from secondary sources, and theories deduced in chapter 2. The discussion has
its foundation in the four questions presented in chapter 1, structured in resemblance as the
preceding chapter.
The research question in this thesis is whether Statoil's management system is sufficient to
avoid potential major accidents from happening at the Snorre A platform. Therefore, it
becomes important to find out if the organization has implemented the requirements from the
PSA thoroughly in the management system, and provided sufficient changes to secure safe
operations. Also, to find out to what extent learning from the accident has led to changes in
the management system, through transferring of knowledge and experience.
6.1 Has Statoil Managed to Comply with the Requirements Imposed by the
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway after the Snorre A Accident?
6.1.1 The Implementation of Requirements by the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway
As the findings from the interview with the PSA suggest, Statoil has worked hard to
implement the initiatives to close the variances found by the PSA. Statoil and the PSA had
frequent meetings where they tried to close these variances best way possible. As stated by
the PSA, Statoil struggled to find the direct effect these initiatives had on the company. This
is because many initiatives affected each other, as well as some leading to unintentionally
competing goal conflicts, and thereby causing negative effects. This was found in the PSA's
supervision of Statoil in the period February - June in 2007. The PSA supervised Statoil to
examine how the company ensured that the initiatives were followed through. This included
improvement areas and if the essential initiatives provided had desired effects through HSE
levels, and thereby improving safety (PSA, 2007).
The PSA (2007) stated that Statoil's new structure seemed thought-through, and perceived as
having an evident reformation. However, they identified a few deviations. First, the
established processes in Statoil, to secure the follow-up activities, did not ensure the
requirements in the regulations. Second, inadequate systematics of Statoil's management
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system, to secure its functionalism, were found. Third, the company had not fully established
and complied with HSE routines. Eventually, sufficient tools to measure how the
implemented initiatives contributed to the desired effect in the company were not available.
Nevertheless, attempts of measuring the impacts have been done by Studio Apertura/NTNU
Samfiumsforskning, in cooperation with an internal project group at Statoil. They found
significant improvements in many areas regarding safety. Including that the Snorre A
organization has been supplied with new resources, gotten well integrated in the Statoil
organization, and improved the access of competence and experience from Statoil. ht
addition, there were improvements regarding collaboration, and communication between off-
and onshore installations at Snorre A. The technical condition has also been improved, which
gives better opportunities for systematic. and planned work. The governing documentation
has been simplified and reduced, and there is more time to consider conflicts between safety
and progress (Schiefloe et. al, 2007).
Schiefloe, et al., (2007) also found areas that needed more considering. This was, among other
factors, the need for simplification of utilizing systems and tools for registration,
identification of risk, and risk-analysis. The new management system ARIS ensures this in a
better way than DocMap and APOS did.
6.1.2 Tiredness of Initiatives
Several of the informants in the IRIS (2011) report say that there are too many initiatives after
an accident in Statoil. It is hard to relate to the great quantity of measures. It is easy to propose
initiatives, but harder to implement them. The amount of measures can, according to the
informants, be the great respect Statoil has towards the PSA, and that Statoil often get too
eager to improve.
The second challenge with the initiatives, in addition to being many, is that they do not
necessary connect. One informant from the IRIS (2011) report asserted that the initiatives
often compete, since they come from departments with different interests. Most of those
talking about the initiative's focus, see most benefit to those directly tied to the area which
needs improvement, and that possible learning has its basis in concrete areas of improvement
adjusted to the units. Among other factors, many refer to the Colleague program as a positive
initiative, however that it needs adjustment to fit the different parts of the organization.
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6.2 What Changes Have Been Made in Statoil's Management System since
2004?
Statoil's management system has been through many changes since 2004. It was already
through a process of change when the Snorre A accident happened. This was a desire from
employees, but also through requirements from the PSA, national and international
requirements, as well as other changes in the environment.
When the Snorre A accident happened, the management system was characterized by very
complex procedures. The operations were document oriented, and assignments were either too
little or too much defined. It was also a culture of doing tasks in a way that the prevailing
research communities thought was right. However, there are a few deviations found in the
IRIS (2011) report that varies from what is stated in the management system, and provides
information to the discussion beyond what was found in the interviews. This will be discussed
based on the pentagon model presented in chapter 2.
6.2.1 Formal Structure
In 2007, Statoil and Hydro merged. Accordingly, there were a full integration of activities,
resources and governing documentation. Every employee got new positions, including
changed tasks and roles. As part of the integration process, Statoil's system for governing
documentation DocMap was copied in Hydro's corresponding system APOS. The intention
was to simplify operations, however, the result was increased complexity. This was visible
through too many documents, and a challenge of dividing between processes, requirements
and methods (IRIS, 2011).
Statoil's management system has gone from using DocMap, via APOS, and now to their new
system ARIS. The development of ARIS has been a comprehensive project to make it more
understandable. This system is more simplified, and has easier search monitors. There has
also been an evident clean up in governing documentation. Hence, the system has gone from
being document- to process oriented.
Also, a focus on using systems in all processes carried out. Since Statoil operates in the
United States, and a part of the New York Stock exchange, the company has to comply with
the SOX requirements. These regulations demand that every decision and process in the
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companymustbe traceable.Thishasalsoleadto themanagementsystembeingdeveloped
accordingly.Thisbecameevidentinoneof theinterviewsfroma researcherfromNTNU.
Therearedefiniteprocesseswhichtheemployeemustfollowwhenworkis carriedout.This
canalsobe one of thereasonswhyStatoilhavegonefrombeingdocumentorientedto process
oriented(IRIS,2011).
6.2.1.1 Governing Documentation
In the Statoilbook,it is statedthatgoverningdocumentationshouldsecurestandardization,
anduseof bestpracticeacrossthecompany.Often,whenincidentshappen,attentionis drawn
towardsaddingchangesto preventthemfromhappeningagain.Whatoftenhappens,is that
requirementsandspecificationsareadded,whichleadsto morecomplexity.
However,the IRISreportwascarriedoutin 2011,andchangeshavehappenedsincethen.
Therehavebeena reductionof governingdocumentationof40percent,whichcomplieswith
wishesin the organization.Fromtheinterviews,especiallyfromtheinformantworkingat the
SnorreA platform,therewereopinionsof thegoverningdocumentationbeingstrongly
improved
6.2.1.2 Synergi
In spiteof knowledgethroughouthecompanyof Synergi,IRIS(2011)foundthattheuse,and
satisfactionwiththis systemis limited.Ofthosehavingknowledgeof thesystem,Synergiis
notmuchused.A reasonforthisis a perceptionof Synergiasbeingmessy,andhardto
navigatethrough.Also,fromthisreporta tendencyof documentingownexperiencesto a
largerextentthanusingothers'experienceswasvisible.Further,a tendencyof somenotusing
the systemin spiteof seeingtheinformationasusefulwerefound.Thiscanbe explainedby
factorsas littletimeanddifficultiesof findingtherightinformationin thesystem.
Fromthe interviewscarriedoutin thisthesis,it seemsas Synergiis a wellknowntoolwhich
is muchused.At the SnorreA platform,theyreporteveryincidenthappeningin thissystem.
In addition,if thereareanyquestionsregardingcertainactivities,Synergiis used.However,
the employeefromthe SnorreAplatformstatedthatit canbecomplicatedto useat first,but
whensufficienttimehavebeenemployedto understandit, it is a goodsystem.
6.2.1.3Process Owners
Process-owner'sroleis aboutinterceptingbestpracticeandexperiences,andto incorporate
theseintoglobalwork-processes.Therefore,theyhavea centralresponsibilitywithARIS.It
is obviousthattheworkprocessbasedmanagementsystem,andthefunctional-requirements
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are very central at Statoil. IRIS's (2011) findings still show that the process owners are "too
far away", as in lack of knowledge and understanding of how they practice the operations in
the organizations. Their findings also show that process-owners behave and think after a rule-
based action logic, while those working out in the organization have a more task-based action
logic.
In the Statoil-book, five organizational principles are listed. These are supposed to support a
"well-defined and simple organizational design that has flexibility to handle changes in the
business and its surroundings". Many of IRIS's findings prove that there is not sufficient
conformity between the content and practice of these organizational principles.
6.2.1.4 Compliance and Leadership
The updated management system ARIS simplifies compliance. This is since project
evaluation "selected themes" will cover compliance with the requirements. IRIS (2011) found
that best practice is assessed more often, and has gotten broader sharing. There are more clear
risk-evaluation processes and methods, and a clear methodology of links, barriers, and logs on
change, action and decision-making. This was also found through the results presented in
chapter 5. As one of the informants from the Snorre A platform stated: "workers not
complying with the management control system have nothing to do at the platform."
6.2.2 Culture
To deal with the culture problem, rotation of personnel on the various platforms have been
made. As stated from one of the informants working at Statoil, leaders are vital in the process
of building a good safety culture. They must ensure that everyone working at the installation
comply with the regulations for the various operations. As the PSA said: "today, there is a
clear plan of action". The A standard (Compliance and Leadership) ensures that a risk
evaluation is made before tasks are initiated.
One of the informants from Snorre A asserted that they have sufficient training and exercises
every time they are back at the platform. In addition, there have also been sufficient programs
and training from management, for example through the Colleague Program and the campaign
on falling objects.
The management system requires everyone to comply with requirements and governing
documentation when operations are performed. The employees do not have the freedom to
solve problems themselves anymore. In addition, they have pre-work meetings and stop and
evaluate if they face new situations.
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Generally,therearemajorchangesin the safetyculturesince2004.It is a differentwayof
thinking;includinga moredevelopedHSEmindset,higherfocusonthebehaviorof the
employee,andcompliancewiththemanagementcontrolsystem.
6.2.3 Interaction
Thereis seenmuchbettercooperationoff-andonshore,inadditionto morerobustplanning
processes,involvementof theplatformorganizationinplanning,aswellas moretrainingof
management.The SnorreA organizationhavealsobeenintegratedin Statoil.
6.2.4 Relations Network
Statoilhas closecollaborationwiththeircontractorsandpartnersto ensuresafeoperations.
Thisis alsoemphasizedin theStatoilBook.Aninterestingfindinginthe IRIS(2011)reportis
thatthereis a differencebetweenemployeesandcontractorsinuseofthevariouspartsofthe
managementsystemin Statoil.Thecontractorsuseothers'experienceto a greaterextent,than
thoseemployedat Statoil.Anexplanationto thiscanbe thatcontractorsfloatbetween
differentorganizations,andareusedto adjustingto newenvironments.Thisrequirean ability
to seeknewknowledge,talkingto otherpeople,andparticipatingin informallearning-
environments.Permanentlyemployedpeoplearemorenaturallytiedto fixedandformal
routines,andmanagementsystems.
Statoildoesalsohavecloserelationsto thePSA,notin formof collaboration,however,
througha gooddialogueto securesafeoperationsontheNorwegiancontinentalshelf.
6.2.5 Technology
Therehasbeenanevidentdevelopmentin technologysince2004.Theheadofprocess
drillingsaidin the interviewthattechnologyis continuouslyimprovingtowardsthebetter.
TheinformantfromtheSnorreA platformsaidthatsystemsaretodaytellingwhensomething
needsreplacement,in differenceto beforewhentheyusedtheseuntilit wasbroken.Healso
assuredthattoday'stechnologyensuresbetterinformationandmeasuresat theplatform.
However,manyof the informantsfromthe IRIS(2011)reportindicatetechnologyas a
challenge.Newtechnologyis implementedthrougha standardizationmindset,however
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createsproblemssinceeachplatformdemanddifferenttechnologicalsolutions.A question
askedby IRIS(2011)is thereforehowtheseinnovationsaffectriskandsafetyin complex
technologicalsystems.Theoil industryexistsof moderntechnologicalsystemsthatare
constantlyexposedof requirementsof cost-effectivechanges,adaptationandadjustments.
Technologicalsystemsaretodaycharacterizedby mutualdependence,andtightcoupling
betweenthecomponents.Theactorsin thesystemhavea desireof increasingtheinnovation
ability,to lowercosts,andto increasetherobustnessregardingaccidents.Highdevelopment
in technology,andincreasedrobustnessis oftena incompatibledimensions.Mutual
dependenceandtightcoupling,contributesto smallchangesin thesystembeingtransmitted
to therestof the system.Continuousinnovation-andtecimologicalchangeprocesseswillthus
createlatentconditionsin thesystem.Consequently,manysmallincrementalinnovationswill
increasetherisk in the system(IRIS,2011).
Changein oneelementof thesystemrequireschangesandmodificationsin a seriesof other
elementsat the sametime.Theproblemis thatthereareneitherresources,norcompetence,or
systemswithsufficientoverviewto completethenecessaryadjustments.IRIS(2011)found
thatmanyemployeeshavereportedaboutsystemsbeingtoocomplex,andthatknowledge
aboutit is to poorandis notalwaysusedin therightway.Theseresponsesmakevisiblehow
newtechnology,organizationalearning,andadaptationconstitutesto vulnerabilitieswiththe
system.Incrementalchangeswillimmediatelyrequireneweducation,trainingandquick
reorganizations.If thisdoesnottakeplace,innovationanduseofnewtechnologywillleadto
increasedrisk.
6.3 To What Extent Has Learning from the Snorre A Accident Led to Changes in
the Management System?
Learningis crucialwhenit comestopreventingotheraccidentsfromhappening.Learning
fromthe SnorreA accident,as wellasotheraccidents,haveledto a needforchangein
Statoil'smanagementsystem.
6.3.1 Sharing of Experience and Knowledge
TheSnorreA accidentledto a processof understandingwhatwasabsentin themanagement
systemto securesafeoperations.Later,therehavebeensubsequentupdatesto establishbetter
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solutionsto handlesimilaraccidentsin the future.Thisis beenseenthroughallpartsof the
pentagonmodelstructuringthemanagementsystemin thisthesis;formalstructure,culture,
interaction,relationsnetworkandtechnology.Thisis alsowhatis calledsinglelooplearning
(Kaufmannand Kaufmann,1996).
Experienceand knowledgeobtainedaftertheSnorreA accidentarevitalcontributorsof
preventionof otheraccidentsif usedcorrectly.Thisexperienceis sharedthroughthe different
systemsavailablein the managementsystem,andis emphasizedthroughStatoil's"Ambition
to Action".An objectiveis thatinformationmustbe open,andavailableforeveryoneto
promotesharingof knowledgeandensurebestpracticein theentireorganization.Relative
KPIsin Ambitionto Actionarerecommendedasa methodto stimulatelearningfromunits
thataresuccessfulbothwithinandoutsidethecompany.Themanysystemsfortransferof
knowledgein Statoil,includingSynergi,werenotusedsufficientlybytheemployeesat
SnorreA, at the timewhentheaccidenthappened.Thiswassinceit wasregardedas difficult
andbothersome.Therehavebeenrequirementsof simplifyingthemanagementsystem.
Throughthe interviews,it wasrevealedthatthishasbeenmuchmoreeasyto use.It hasalso
becomeeasierforemployeesto understandgoverningdocumentation.Thishelpstransferring
of competenceandknowledge,andmakeit accessibleforallpartsof theorganization.
Throughsurveyscarriedoutby IRIS(2011),it wasalsoevidentthatemployeeshavea
relativegoodknowledgeofmostof thesystems,inrelationto whatwasthe casein 2004.
However,somesaythatoften,sharingofknowledgeandexperienceonly"possibly"gets
updatedin govemingdocumentation.Others,ontheotherhand,aretiredovertoomany
initiativesbeingpunchedintogoverningdocumentation,implyingthatthemanagement
systemgetsheterogeneous,controlbasedandnotsuitableto use(IRIS,2011).
6.3.2 Difficulties of Learning
Comprehensiveworkhasbeenmadeto communicatetheexperiencesfromtheSnorreA
accidentto otherenvironmentsthroughoutStatoil.However,severalincidents,includingthe
GullfaksC accidentis proofofthisnotbeingsufficientlyintegrated.
ManyaspectsareinfluencingStatoil'sabilityto learn.Statoilis a largecompany,withmany
differentemployees,varyinggeographicalinstallationsandorganizations.Thismakesit more
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difficult for the company to transfer knowledge and learning. A reason for this may also be
that when initiatives are implemented, it is not certain that everyone understands it.
Lack of learning was seen after the accident at another Statoil platform, Gullfaks C in 2010,
due to goal-conflicts. Many of the measures after Snorre A were individually good measures;
they had a broad coverage and touched upon many important areas, and contributed to closing
variances. However, one of the main problems were that the methods used to implement an
initiative prevented achievement of goals in other areas. A focus on planning and risk
evaluation contributed to more detailed work processes and more bureaucracy, whereas other
initiatives were carried out to simplify governing documentation and reduce bureaucracy. In
addition, a comprehensive focus on the initiatives and closing variances came at the expense
of learning after the actual incident (IRIS, 2011).
6.4 Does the Current Management System Ensure Safety?
As found from the results in chapter 5, there is a completely different way of thinking now
than in 2004. This is demonstrated through a higher management focus, and standardization
of procedures. Also, it was found that there is a higher focus on behavior and compliance to
secure safety in operations. This can be related to the behavior-based safety perspective,
which says that employees often are reason for accidents happening, and that training in the
management system is the best way to leam from mistakes.
A thorough comprehension found by Schiefloe, et al. (2007) is also a higher focus on safety
through the management system, both at Snorre A, and in Statoil generally. This is supported
by the majority of the organization, through general safety being ensured in every operation.
Firstly, this has become evident in an increased attention of current problems regarding well
integrity. Secondly, a general awareness regarding the need to prioritize safety, and to take the
time and costs necessary have been visible. This is demonstrated by clear signals from
corporate management and DPN. Eventually, there are more resilient planning and emphasize
placed on following every regulation in governing documentation.
It was visible through the interviews that the increase in safety can be, among other factors,
because of Statoil's clear plan of action, in addition to a higher focus on major accidents. The
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people working at the platform are in addition more restrained by requirements, and following
governing documentation today. It was also mentioned that it is more time available to
evaluate tasks, and to stop the operation if something is not right.
Table 1 show the safety development at Snorre A from Schiefloe, et al.'s (2007) work.
Every situation taken into consideration:"I believe that SnorreA is operated in a more secure mannernow
than before the SnorreA accident" (Answersfrom employeesat Snorre)
Extremely disagree ExtremelyAgree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1.1 % 0.8 % 3.0 % 2.3 % 3.8 % 12.5% 23.9 % 19.3% 13.3% 20.1 %
Table 1: Safety Development at Snorre A
(translated from Norwegian. Source: Schiefloe et al, 2007)
Many of the informants said in this relation that the Colleague-program, and the campaign
against falling objects have contributed additional improvement of safety at Snorre A. This
was also stated by one of the informants from the interviews. Aspects of the Colleague
program emphasized by employees, is an increased consciousness of safety in general, and
that everyone participating has made it more legitimate to care, and to tell if other colleagues
are behaving in a way that put themselves or others at danger (Schiefloe, et al., 2007). The
total safety effects can be understood as an interaction of several factors as showed in Figure
6:
- Å
I -
- Attitudes
- Understanding
- Culture
./
Figure 6: Safety Improvement
(Schiefloe, et al., 2007)
Improvements
Technical
Administrative
Planning
Processes
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Schiefloe,et al. (2007)foundthatSnorreA operatesin a moresecuremannerthanbefore
2004.Thecauseis a generalstrengtheningof theorganizationalsafetybarriers.A division
wasmadebetweenfourgroupsof organizationalsafetybarriers,as shownin Figure7. Formal
mechanismsarethoseregulatedthroughrules,licenseforcertification,governing
documentationandformalizedproceduresforplanning,decision-makingandwork
performance.Simply,onecanputthesein groupsofmechanismsofdoingtherightthings,
andmechanismsto ensurequalitycontrol.Thisindicatesgoodplanningandparticipation
frommanagemento developa goodmanagementsystemthatemployeesuse in theirdaily
operations.
Informalmechanismsarethesafetycriticalbehaviorof employees.Criticalaspectsare
sharingof experienceandknowledge,as wellasco-workerscontrollingeachotherby
vigilanceandcaring.Itbecomesimportanto focusoncreatinga goodnetworkandculture
withintheorganization.Thisis doneby qualitycontrolfromtheorganizationthrough
differentprograms,in additionto focusoncontinuousrotationofpersonnelandintegration
(Schiefloe,et al., 2007).
Doing the right things
Quality control
Formal mechanisms
Training
Governing
documentation
- Improvements
Management
involvement
Planning and control
Participation 

Informal mechanisms
• Development of network
• Rotation of personnel
• Integration in Statoil
• The Colleague program
Caring
Legitimacy
Figure 7: Formal and informal mechanisms
(translated from Norwegian to English. Schiefloe, et al., 2007)
Theseexplanatoryfactorscanbe summarizedin theanalyticalPentagonmodel.Thereis a
positivedevelopmentalongalldimensions,whichis summarizedin theFigure8below:
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Organization and
regulations
Technology and
operations
Relationsand
Values, networks
attitudes and
competence
Work processes/interaction
Cooperation. Communication
and management
Figure 8: Safety Critical Behavior
(translated from Norwegian to English. Source Schiefloe, et al., 2007)
(FAST= Improvementof governingdocumentationand monitoring)
Even though the management system is to ensure safe operations, and prevent accidents from
happening, it becomes important that the employees complies with this system. If people do
not use the management system and the governing documentation when performing activities,
this will increase the risk in the company. Therefore, the PSA (2010a) emphasizes different
aspects affecting safety critical behavior, and a focus on evident HSE objectives for change.
The work environment, and organizational risk contributors must be emphasized thoroughly
as technical contributors. The actors must utilize own methods of risk evaluation, and interests
must be acknowledged and handled through planned cooperation.
6.5 Potential Major Accidents in the Future
There are many viewpoints of why accidents happen, and whether organizations are able to
prevent them from happening. Some of these were discussed in chapter two, including high
reliability theory, normal accident theory, and the resilient engineering perspective.
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6.5.1 Why Do Potential Major Accidents Still Happen?
The PSA has employed many resources in recent years to reduce numbers of incidents, and to
improve the safety-level at the Norwegian continental shelf. The annual report on the project
"Risk level on Norwegian Continental Shelf" showed positive trends in some areas, but no
changes worth mentioning on the joint risk-level. Statoil has in this period suffered many
incidents with considerable potential (PSA, 2007).
In the interviews, it was evident that an explanation for accidents still happening, can be the
changing external conditions in this industry. Both the informant from the Snorre A platform
and the PSA confirmed this. This leads to Statoil dealing with many unexpected dangers and
challenges. Because of this, the PSA said it is hard to assure that accidents will not happen.
Various opinions of accidents being preventable or not, was visible in the interviews. Both
the PSA, and the head of process drilling, said that a good framework must be available for
the company to carry out safe operations. Nevertheless, the PSA does not expect a risk level
of zero, nor does the head of process drilling. The head of process drilling said that with so
many employees working at Statoil, it is difficult to ensure that no mistakes happen. These
statements show signs of both normal accident theory and high reliability theory. Statoil, on
the other hand, is explicit by saying that every accident can be prevented. This implies that
with use of intelligent organizational design, sufficient recruitment, socializing, and training
of personnel, error rates can be reduced. Also, an emphasis exists on the need for sufficient
barriers.
However, in addition to creating a good framework, all the informants, and especially the
PSA, emphasized the need for competence and resources for preventing accidents. One of the
informants from NTNU said that this is achievable through creating a resilient organization.
Since this perspective builds upon many theories, it can be discussed whether this is a more
developed mindset of understanding how to avoid potential major accidents.
The optimal situation for Statoil to prevent accidents could be to develop robust
characteristics, and thereby foresee every potential major accident. Statoil does possess robust
organizational characteristics mentioned, as knowledge, competence, resources, and time. In
addition, the company shows signs of reacting to most errors and disturbances through high
developed technology and good monitoring-systems. However, signs are visible of leaming
difficulties, as well as the ability to foresee every accident. Therefore, Statoil lacks some of
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the important robust qualities. A question to be asked is whether these remaining qualities are
possible to achieve.
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7 Conclusion
This chapter presents the master's thesis conclusion. The conclusion is based upon existing
theory presented in chapter two, in addition to the results and discussion presented in chapter
five and six. The research is a qualitative case study, and therefore only intended to contribute
to an increased understanding of the subject, as well as a supplement to further research.
7.1 Is the Current Management System at Statoil Sufficient to Prevent Potential
Major Accidents from Happening at the Snorre A Platform?
The research question in this master's thesis is if the current management system at Statoil is
sufficient to prevent potential major accidents from happening at the Snorre A platform. To
provide guidance in the search for solutions, four question have served as a foundation
throughout the thesis. These are whether Statoil has managed to comply with the requirements
imposed by the PSA after the accident, to what extent learning from the accident has led to
changes in the management system, what changes have been made since 2004, and if the
current management system ensures safety.
Statoil has corrected all the requirements imposed by the PSA after the Snorre A accident.
There were many infirmities detected regarding the management system, and Statoil has
employed many resources to improve. In addition, other incidents and requirements from
employees have also led to changes being pushed forward.
Since 2004, changes have been made in all parts of the pentagon model, including formal
structure, culture, interaction, relations and network, and technology. This includes, among
other factors, a simplification of governing documentation and systems, standardization and
harmonization of procedures, going from being document to process oriented, as well as a
higher focus on compliance. In addition, technology has improved, rotation of personnel have
been made, and the Snorre A organization is completely integrated in Statoil. This contributes
to a higher level of safety both at Snorre A and in Statoil today. In addition, there is more
focus on preventing major accidents at Statoil.
Even though learning has occurred through public reactions and own experiences, the
company does show lack of compliance with the changes made throughout the different
divisions. This is visible through the Gullfaks C accident, where many of the same underlying
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causes as the Snorre A accident were found. This implies that it is not always a direct
coupling between experience and learning in organizations.
Even though there have been significant improvements in Statoil's management system since
2004, the question becomes if these are sufficient, and whether the improvements can prevent
a major potential accident from happening at the Snorre A platform again. The results show
that there are varying viewpoints on this matter. These are similar to both normal accidents
theory, high reliability theory, and the resilient engineering perspective.
Statoil has developed a good framework through the management system, and provides
training and courses when changes are made. However, the company has learning difficulties
and does not possess the ability to foresee every accident happening. The company does
therefore lack some of the important qualities to develop a resilient organization.
The Snorre A platform has become one of the better installations after the accident. However,
the PSA, nor most of the other informants, do not expect a risk level of zero owing to the
complexity prevailing in this industry. Therefore, it becomes difficult to say if a management
system can prevent potential major accidents from happening. As the land chief from Snorre
A stated:
"The management system is under continuous development; however, any accident can
challenge that in thefuture."
7.2 Further Research
There are a few aspects found in this master's thesis that can be interesting to investigate
further. This is especially regarding the many changes in Statoil's management system. There
can be unforeseen consequences leading to both similar, as well as other accidents happening.
Further investigation can take its basis in the following questions:
Because of every platform's distinct characteristics, can standardization of
procedures lead to an increased probability of accidents happening?
What effect have rotation of personnel on competence and knowledge?
What factors do Statoil neglect, since many of the accidents happening have the
same underlying consequences?
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Which measures can be used to improve the ability to lay ahead of potential major
accidents?
How can Statoil increase learning throughout the company after potential major
accidents?
In addition to these questions, it will be interesting to investigate whether it is possible for
Statoil to obtain the remaining characteristics which defines a resilient organization. Also, if it
is possible for these to be persistent, and thereby endure, in spite of the many changes
prevailing in the petroleum industry. When doing a more in-depth study of this, an emphasis
must be on including more aspects regarding Statoil's ability to learn, than what is mentioned
in this thesis. This also includes an investigation of other internal and external factors
affecting potential major accidents.
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